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During the Flynn administration, the City of Boston developed a
policy on how to return vacant and tax delinquent buildings to
residential use. The goal of the vacant building policy is to
break the cycle of property abandonment and to increase the
municipal tax base. To achieve these goals, the City developed
legal and administrative mechanisms to return abandoned buildings
to tax-paying owners.
However, an evaluation of the policy implementation revealed that
the City may not be able to achieve these goals. Moreover, the
policy approach of returning abandoned buildings to tax-paying
owners may be counter productive to another important goal of the
Flynn administration, increasing the supply of affordable housing
for Boston's poor residents. The policy approach was criticized
based on a review of the literature of neighborhood change, which
revealed that Boston's vacant building policy does not address
how the renewed profitability of Boston's residential real estate
has changed abandoned buildings from economic losers to targets
for investor-speculators. The policy focuses instead on property
abandonment, which plagued Boston's inner city residential
neighborhoods in the 1970s. The City's vacant building policy,
in encouraging private for-profit ownership of vacant buildings,
contributes to the gentrification of poor neighborhoods, and
thus, to a loss of affordable housing.
An alternative policy approach to returning vacant buildings to
residential use evolved out of the earlier analysis. The goal of
the new policy is to create affordable housing out of abandoned
buildings rather than to maximize the tax base. A proposed
method of implementing such a policy relies on existing legal
mechanisms and institutions, primarily the nascent Citywide Land
Trust and regulations that control how investors use residential
real estate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Boston is plaqued by a striking development paradox. Vacant
residential buildings remain in Boston's renewing neighborhoods
even though today's city can be characterized by a shortage of
housing available to low income people. While Boston's poor
residents desperately seek affordable housing, housing units
remain unoccupied in both declining and renewing neighborhoods.
To explore this paradox, I first examined Boston's policy on
vacant buildings. Boston's vacant building policy does not
tackle vacant buildings in renewing areas, only those located in
declining neighborhoods that have been abandoned by their owners.
Boston's policy goal is to increase the amount of collectable
real estate taxes by selling tax-foreclosed vacant buildings, or
abandoned buildings, to tax-paying residents. However, this
policy goal conflicts with another of the City's goals--
increasing affordable housing opportunities for the city's low
income residents.
Drawing on the literature of neighborhood decline and
gentrification, I propose that the policy is grounded in a
misconception of how Boston's inner city neighborhoods are
developing in the 1980s. While the policy targets the property
abandonment crisis of the 1970s, it neglects to focus on, and
therefore contributes to, the gentrification process of the 1980s
that transforms low income housing into upper income housing.
In the early stages of gentrification, speculators purchase
and hold vacant these previously abandoned buildings, paying
municipal real estate taxes and eventually reselling them at
inflated prices. When this occurs, the buildings cannot be
foreclosed by the City or inexpensively purchased and
rehabilitated into low-cost housing for the City's poor
residents. While Boston's vacant building policy may expand the
municipal tax base--an important goal for a city, like Boston,
that has a high proportion of tax-exempt land owners, the policy
may prove to reduce the city's supply of housing opportunities
for low income residents.
I begin by addressing the issues above in a review of
Boston's vacant building policy in Section II. I outline in
Section III the weaknesses of how the City implemented the
policy. The policy was translated into a set of administrative
and legal mechanisms to implement the policy that cannot
ultimately achieve the policy goal. In this section, I also
argue that the policy approach of returning abandoned buildings
to private for-profit owners may prove to be counter productive
to the City's goal of increasing the supply of low income
housing.
My evaluation of the City's vacant building policy provides
the basis for a new policy approach to returning vacant buildings
to residential use in Boston. This new policy approach,
presented in Section IV, can enable the City to both expand the
city's supply of affordable housing and return tax delinquent
buildings to tax-paying owners.
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II. THE CITY OF BOSTON'S POLICY ON THE REUSE OF VACANT BUILDINGS
The Flynn administration has made the reclamation of
abandoned buildings a top priority... at a time when the
need for decent and affordable housing for people of
low and moderate income has reached a state of crisis,
thousands of housing units are left abandoned and in
disrepair. Boston cannot afford to waste these
valuable resources.
-Report of the Property Disposition Committee,
January, 1985
The Flynn administration recognizes vacant buildings as a
resource for increasing the supply of housing in the City of
Boston. In September of 1984, Mayor Flynn created the Property
Disposition Committee to develop a policy on how to return the
city's vacant buildings to residential use. Since that time,
Boston's vacant building policy has continued to evolve. I will
present the policy in three components: the formal policy as
stated in a January 1985 report by the Property Disposition
Committee (PDC), the developing Abandoned Building Pilot Program,
and the information network within which the the PDC's policy
functions.
A. The Progrty Disgogition Committee's Vacant Building Pglicy
What shall we do with physical assets that retain
social value long after they have ceased to serve
economic purposes judged by market criteria?
-James Franklin, 1972
The PDC was originally composed of the City's department
heads of the Real Property Department (RPD), the Redevelopment
Authority (BRA), Public Facilities Department (PFD), as well as
the Mayor's Housing Specialist and the head of the now defunct
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Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency (NDEA). This team
was created to develop the City's policy on vacant buildings and
continues to direct how the vacant building policy takes shape
during the Flynn administration.
The Issue: Abandoned Buildings
In creating the vacant building policy, the Property
Disposition Committee targeted vacant buildings which had been
abandoned by their owners (PDC, 1985:1; CH, 1/12/86).
Abandonment of property is the process by which an owner
gradually reduces investment in maintaining and operating a
building. The owner discontinues all building maintenance and
repairs, real estate tax payments, and heat and utility payments
in response to personal financial constraints and/or perceptions
that the property has no market value. (Lake, 1979:158-60). The
law defines abandonment as when an owner has voluntarily given
up all rights to her property.(1) Therefore, property
abandonment occurs most often in neighborhoods having no
foreseeable real estate market.
Consequently, the policy goal as stated by the PDC is to
break the cycle of property abandonment in neighborhoods having
relatively large numbers of vacant buildings by first acquiring
abandoned properties and then selling them to responsible
1. According to I American Jurisrugnge 2d, 2nd ed., an
abandoned property is "that to which the owner has voluntarily
relinquished all right, title, claim, and possession, with the
intention of terminating his ownership, but without vesting
in another person and with the intention of not reclaiming future
possession or resuming its ownership, possesssion, or enjoyment".
Cities measure this act of abandoning property in various ways,
including the failure to pay real estate taxes, to rent units in
a rental building, or to maintain the building.
a
citizens (PDC, 1985:1).
Whatever the cause, abandonment always involves tax-
delinquency, which makes the property available for an
inexpensive government acquisition.
-Hartman, 1961
The policy stipulates that a property owner has abandoned
her property when she does not pay real estate taxes (PDC,
1985:1). Tax delinquency for more than one year is the
operational definition used to measure abandonment; when an owner
stops paying real estate taxes for more than one year, the owner
is presumed to be disinvesting in the property. Boston acquires
abandoned buildings by foreclosing on tax delinquent
properties.(2) Real estate tax delinquency creates an
opportunity for Boston to legally take properties that fail to
produce tax revenues and contribute to neighborhood bl i ght.
When Boston forecloses on a tax delinquent property, it can then
return the property to a responsible or tax-paying owner who will
return the building to use as housing.
Appendix A outlines the tax title foreclosure process in
Boston and defines the role of the City agencies in the process
of tax collection and foreclosure.
2. Boston may foreclose on tax delinquent real property
as determined in Section 58 of Chapter 60 of Massachusett's
General Laws. A building is legally tax delinquent thirty days
after taxes for the fiscal year are due and unpaid (PDC,
1985:27). The Massachusett's General Laws define an abandoned
building as both vacant and tax delinquent; according to Section
81IA of Chapter 60 of the General Laws, an abandoned property is a
property which a "city or town has...taken for non-payment of
taxes... and has reason to believe is unoccupied... (as verified
by an inspector of buildings)".
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Boston has approximately 400 tax delinquent and vacant
buildings, according to an NDEA survey completed in May of 1985
(PFD, 1986). Fourty-six percent of these abandoned buildings are
in the tax-title stage of the tax-title foreclosure process,
while the remainder have had petitions to foreclose filed in the
Land Court (PDC, 1985:29). The NDEA survey also identified 68
City-owned vacant properties. Therefore, Boston has
approximately 468 abandoned buildings.
Large scale property abandonment occurs in Boston's poor
neighborhoods with low real estate values (Gaston & Kennedy,
1985:14; PDC, 1985:3). Seventy-one percent of Boston's 600
vacant residential buildings are located in Roxbury and
Dorchester, two of the poorest areas in the City (PDC, 1985:26).
In such neighborhoods, residential property cannot be operated
profitably. A low income population does not have the financial
resources to pay rents that would cover the costs of operating
and maintaining a building. Since the rent generating ability of
a rental property determines its market value, residential
buildings in low income areas have low market values relative to
property in middle and upper income neighborhoods.
The Poli cy Oppoach:
It is the goal of this Administration to encourage the
purchase and rehabilitation of (abandoned) properties
by responsible, tax paying persons
-George A. Russell Jr.
Collector-Treasurer, Boston
According to the PDC's policy statement, the City's approach
to breaking the cycle of property abandonment is to maximize the
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City's tax base. To achieve this, the City will sell vacant
City-owned surplus properties and other vacant buildings acquired
through tax-title foreclosure to private parties who will return
the build ingn to residential use and pay real estate taxes to the
City (PDC, 1965).
This approach incorporates two principals: maximize tax
revenues from property and minimize property ownership costs to
the City. First, Boston seeks to maximize revenues from property
subject to real estate taxes. Abandoned property, or tax
delinquent property, does not contribute to the City coffers.
Returning tax delinquent properties to responsible private owners
is one way the City can increase the amount of collectable tax
revenues.
Because vacant buildings do not yield taxes, yet
require City services such as fire, boarding, and
maintenance, they significantly drain the City's
financial resources.
-Property Disposition Committee
1965: 1
City-owned abandoned property not only fails to generate tax
revenues, but requires City expenditures for property maintenance
and management. Vacant abandoned buildings are often unprotected
and potentially hazardous buildings. In order to protect the
general public's health and safety, the City must pay for
maintenance, boarding up, extermination, and all other services
as specified by the State Sanitary and Building Codes (Young,
1986). However, Boston does not have the financial resources to
maintain and insure hazardous buildings. Consequently, the City
does not want to hold or bank vacant property any longer than is
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absolutely necessary (Knasas, 1984).
The City's Real Property Department assumes ownership
of all foreclosed property. This (places) the
Department under heavy financial strains and in a
property management role that was not its intended
function.
-Property Disposition Committee
1985: 6
Policy Im2lementation:
The PDC developed three specific criteria for returning City--
owned abandoned buildings to private tax-paying owners: promoting
home ownership, producing affordable housing units, and
increasing community participation in the planning process (PDC,
1985:1).(3)
The PDC identified several obstacles impeding the return of
vacant tax delinquent buildings to tax-paying owners: ignorance
on the part of the City about the location and the
characteristics of abandoned property, tax foreclosure and tax
abatement processes that prevented rapid acquisition of abandoned
property, and the auction system of surplus property disposal
that was insensitive to the three criteria for returning tax-
foreclosed buildings to new owners. PDC's implementation
strategy included adminstrative, procedural, and legislative
changes that attempted to overcome these barriers to achieving
the policy goals for reusing vacant buildings.
Prior to the PDC's efforts to clarify the City's
vacant building policy the City had not established criteria
governing the dispositon of City owned abandoned buildings. The
City's only dispositon guideline was to sell surplus property to
the highest bidder (Knasas, 1984:16).
12
Administrative Change: The Clearing House
The City's lack of knowledge about abandoned buildings was
seen by the PDC as one reason it could not stop property
abandonment from occurring in Boston (PDC, 1985:10). The City
Council established the Clearing House in 1985 to collect data on
the characteristics of abandoned property in Boston. Staffed by
the PFD and the RPD, the Clearing House also functions as a
public information center on how to buy abandoned buildings (CH,
1/24/86).
Currently the Clearing House is:
1. Developing a computerized data base on abandoned property
tracking physical condition, tax delinquency status,
ownership, location, and proposed plans for reuse of every
building (PDC, 1985:11).
2. Providing these data to persons interested in
purchasing and rehabilitating abandoned property (MacNeil
1/28/86).
3. Acting as a public information center on how to buy
abandoned property and where to go to apply for financial
assistance in rehabilitating an abandoned building
(CH, 6/14/85).
4. Ranking tax delinquent vacant bui3dings according to
development need and potential as determined by the RPD, the
PFD, and the Mayor's Office (PDC, 1985:12).
5. Developing a vacant building data base to expand
and update -the NDEA survey of vacant buildings completed in
May of 1965. (Ownership and tax status data in this
report are currently out of date (Welch, 1986).
Property Acquisition:
If the City forecloses on tax delinquent vacant buildings,
it can then sell these buildings to private owners who are likely
to pay real estate taxes to the City. A quick foreclosure
process can mean that the City can acquire the building before it
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is sold to someone else who may not pay the City taxes and return
it to residential use. The PDC spearheaded legislative and
procedural changes in the tax-title foreclosure system enabling
the City to take property and return abandoned property to
private owners more quickly.
In the past, whether or not a vacant building was foreclosed
by the City for back taxes depended on whether its petition to
foreclose was forwarded from the Tax-Title Office to the Land
Court, the final point of a back-logged and lengthy foreclosure
system (Knasas, 1984; APC, 1985). Often the City was reluctant
to initiate action on a tax delinquent vacant property because of
the high liablity assumed with its ownership (Cunio, 1983).
Tax delinquent vacant buildings now have priority over
occupied buildings in the tax-title foreclosure system. The PDC
codified the priority of vacant buildings in tax-title
fore:losure guidelines developed to direct the Tax-Title Office
in processing tax cases (MacNeil, 1986). Expediting the
foreclosure process for vacant buildings speeds the time in which
the City can actually acquire an unused building and introduce it
back into active use as housing (PDC, 1985:12).
Tax -Forecl osure:
Not only was the administration of the foreclosure process
insensitive to Boston's new policy on vacant buildings, but the
laws governing the foreclosure process did not enable the City to
swiftly acquire vacant buildings.
The PDC successfully lobbied the state for legislation
allowing the City to quickly obtain a clear title to foreclosed
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vacant property. House Bill 6374, signed into law on January 7,
1985 reduced the time in which a tax delinquent owner of a vacant
building may appeal final foreclosure by a city from one year to
ninety days. The new law enables Boston to swiftly acquire clear
titles to abandoned properties and still respect due process
requirements for the taking of real property (Amendment to
Section 69A, Ch. 60 of the General Laws).
Tax Abatements:
The new legislation championed by the PDC also enables the
City to offer incentives to private investors who purchase and
renovate vacant tax delinquent buildings according to policy
goals (PDC, 1985:13). The City may now abate full or partial
taxes owed by previous owners of 1-6 unit vacant and abandoned
tax delinquent buildings sold to a new owner before the property
entered the foreclosure process. The new owner may now request
an abatement of back taxes rather than paying the City the full
value of the tax-title in order to clear the title and legally
purchase the building. By abating back taxes, the City removes
the tax-title lien on a property's title, providing a clear title
necessary for the new owner to acquire private loans (Knasas,
1984:42; Amendment to Section 8, Ch. 58 of the General Laws).
By abating back taxes on tax delinquent vacant property, the
City can reduce the cost of aquiring such buildings, potentially
enabling a new owner to develop a tax delinquent building into
affordable housing units. According to the Assessing Office, tax
abatements will be given to those persons who demonstrate a
financial need for the abatement, first-time home buyers who will
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live in and maintain the property for at least three years,
existing tenants, and Boston residents (Assessing Office, 1985;
MacNeil, 1986; PDC, 1985:33).
Property Disposition:
The final component of the vacant building policy replaced
the "highest bidder" auction process for selling City-owned tax
foreclosed properties with a negotiated sales process managed by
the Public Facilities Department (PFD). Boston's old auction
process was not sensitive to the PDC's critieria for reselling
tax-foreclosed buildings. Because the auction process did not
specify reuse conditions low bidders, such as community groups
and low income residents, would rarely outbid real estate
developers. Rather than reform the auction process, the City
choose a negotiated sales process for disposing tax-foreclosed
properties. This system allows the City not only to specify
rehabilitation criteria in the sale agreements, but also to weigh
a potential buyer's reuse goal as well as purchase price in
selecting the new owner.
The Real Property Department's (RPD) role as manager of
foreclosed property was reduced with the new disposition process.
Now the RPD transfers surplus property to the PFD within one
month of City foreclosure, eliminating the high property
management and liability costs RPD was unable to assume (Knasas,
1984:16; MacNeil, 1986). The RPD is now on3y an interim property
manager while PFD takes the lead in the disposition of foreclosed
property.
In the Residential Development Program, as the negotiated
sales process is called, the PFD works with the RPD and the
Mayor's Office to evaluate the best use of foreclosed properties,
considering both the highest ecomonic use of each property and
the development needs of the community. (PFD, 1985). When the
City selects buildings to sell through the negotiated sales
process, the PFD advertises these buildings in the Boston Globe
and local newspapers to solicit proposals for development
(MacNeil, 1986).
In the case of large properties, community meetings are held
to identify the neighborhood's property development criteria.
PFD incorporates community needs into requests for rehabilitation
proposals sent to individuals and developers (MacNeil, 1986).
For smaller properties, the PFD distributes to abuttors notices
of the sale process in order to solicit community input to the
process.
A committee composed of the RDP, the PFD, and the Mayor's
Office selects the new owner of a foreclosed property based on a
buyer's development proposal reflecting neighborhood
compatibility, affordable housing, financial feasibility, and
technical capacity to complete renovation (PFD, 1985; PDC,
1985:14).
The PFD also co-ordinates financial packages for anyone
needing assistance in implementing their proposals. PFD
collaborates with the Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP),
the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, the Massachusetts
Government Land Bank, and the state Executive Office of Community
Development to develop financial plans for rehabilitation
abandoned buildings (PDC, 1985). For example, one of MHP's four
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goals is to support local efforts to reclaim abandoned and vacant
property (MHP, 1986). Recently, Mayor Flynn and the PFD's
Director requested six million dollars in start-up funds from
the MHP to help finance housing on fourteen vacant city-owned
parcels (Globe, 31/29/86b).
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B. Abandoned Building Pilot Program
Boston's vacant building policy is currently expanding to
include City departments involved with maintenance of vacant and
abandoned buildings. Vacant buildings must be protected from
weather, vandals, and arsonists if they are to be rehabilitated
as low income housing (Young, 1986). The Inspectional Services
Department (ISD), the Health Department, and the Mayor's Office
have recently developed a Pilot Program to improve the condition
of a neighborhood's physical environment by engaging residents in
an effort to maintain and improve their homes and their community
(Young, 1986). Limited resources prevent the program from being
implemented in the entire city; the Pilot Program will initially
focus on Dorchester and move to the Franklin Park section of
Roxbury if the Mayor appropriates additional funds to the progam.
The Pilot Program will co-ordinate efforts from three City
departments: the Police Department will remove abandoned cars,
the Building Department will record and cite illegal
construction, the Health Department will forge an attack on the
area's rodents, and the ISD will identify and clean vacant lots
and identify, record, and, as needed, cite, repair, or board up
buildings.
The Pilot ProgCam: ISD's Role
ISD's vacant building maintenance and boarding up activities
have been designed to complement the PDC>s vacant building
policy. The Abandoned Building Unit (ABU) of ISD is the
headquarters of the vacant building element of the Pilot Program.
ABU's primary goal will be to locate all vacant buildings and
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remedy all code violations in these buildings in an effort to
protect vacant buildings (McDermott, 1986).
ABL has just hired ten building inspectors who will complete
weekly walking surveys of Dorchester, recording and updating the
conditions of all the vacant buildings in the area. Young
believes increasing the number of building inspectors is the
first step in improving City information of the location and
characteristics of abandoned buildings since poor maintenance is
one of the first indicators of abandonment.
The building inspectors will survey all building conditions,
entering buildings that appear to be vacant to determine whether
or not occupants live in the building. If the building is
Occupied, the inspectors will ascertain whether the occupants are
legal tenants or squatters.(4)
Information collected by the building inspectors will be
compiled into monthly reports identifying for every building:
whether it is vacant or occupied, construction materials, any
code violations, and type of work needed to remedy the
violations. The building reports will be supplied to the
Clearing House, which has hired a title searcher to identify the
tax status of each identified vacant building. The Clearing
House has requested this information from ISD so that it may
develop a vacant building data base (MacNeil, 1986).
As part of the process of remedying code violations
, 
ABU
must locate the owners of buildings that violate the State
4. The City has no definite policy on what steps to take to
rehouse tenants who live illegally in an abandoned building.
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Building and Sanitation Codes. ISD issues citations notifying
owners of the conditions to be corrected and bills owners for the
costs incurred by the City in repairing and boarding up vacant
buildings. ABU has also hired a title searcher to identify the
owner of record as stated at the Registry of Deeds.(5) As part
of the program, a Constable will hand deliver all violations to
the owner of record.
The Pilot Program will supplement the City's goal of
returning vacant abandoned buildings to occupied housing by
securing Dorchester's vacant buildings against damage, which
could otherwise increase the rehabilitation costs to a new owner.
5. ISD has one title searcher to locate who owns all buildings
and lots requiring notification of a code violation and billing
for City-incurred costs of remedying the violation. The title
searcher hired by ABU will focus only on locating the owners of
vacant buildings and lots, while the Clearing House's title
searcher will identify the tax status of these vacant properties.
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C. Flow of Information On Vacant Buildins Thrgugh The City
Not all of the City's departments that are involved in the
flow of information about vacant buildings were formally
integrated into the strategy developed by the PDC to implement
the vacant building policy. How information flows into the City
and within the City bureaucracy reveals how effective the City is
in learning about vacant buildings.(6)
Both City agencies and neighborhood residents observe vacant
buildings in the community. These eyes of the City transmit
information and complaints about vacant buildings to City Hall.
Building inspectors, police officers, firemen, and the staff of
the Arson Prevention Commission (APC) are the City's formal eyes.
Informal data on vacant buildings reaches the City from abuttors
to vacant property, community groups, community development
corporations (CDC's), and real estate investors.
According to interviews with the Arson Prevention
Commission, the Inspectional Services Department, the Clearing
House, and the Mayor's Office, intra-city agency communications
are not well defined. However, from these discussions I have
been able to chart how information seems to flow from community
and City eyes to City Hall and within City Hall. Chart 1
illustrates how complaints about building conditions flow
6. 1 have included the Clearing House in this discussion to show
how this new City department fits into the information network.
Although the Pilot Program now formally co-ordinates the Police
Department and the Health Department, I have not included this
program as a distinct element in the information flow diagrams
because the Pilot Program has increased the number of inspectors
sending inforination to ISD, while leaving unaltered how the
information flows.
into the bureaucracy, while Chart 2 traces the path of a request
for a vacant building's development through various City
agencies.
Complaints About Building Conditions:
The Arson Prevention Commission (APC) is a valuable source
of information on vacant buildings, which are highly prone to
fires and other forms of vandalism (West, 1986). Each APC staff
member monitors ownership changes, vacancy, mortgage lending
activities, turnover rates, and City planning activities in a
particular section of the city to learn how arson is associated
with property characteristics. According to the Director, the
APC usually informs not only the Mayor's Office, but the RPD and
the Clearing House when they identify a new vacant building. APC
and the Fire Department communicate frequently about vacant
buildings as well.
According to the secretaries who screen all calls into the
Mayor's Office, when a citizen calls to complain about a vacant
building's condition, the Mayor's Office calls the Collector-
Treasurer or the Registry of Deeds to see who owns the building.
If the City owns the building, the Mayor's Office calls the
department holding jurisdiction over the building-the BRA, PFD,
or RPD-and directs them to remedy the nuisance condition
(Young,1986). If the building is privately owned, yet posing
health and safety hazards, the Mayor's Office calls the
Inspectional Services Department (ISD), which corrects the
nuisance conditions by boarding up the building. If the building
is also tax delinquent the Mayor's Office calls the Clearing
House, which can begin planning for the acquisition and sale of
the property.
According to Bill Young of the ABU, the Police and Fire
Departments, as well as the Mayor's Office, notify the ABU when
unsafe and open vacant buildings require services.
Community and activist groups contact the Mayor's Office to
complain about the conditions of vacant buildings.
Chart 1: COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF VACANT
BUILDINGS
Inspector
Police Inspectional
Services
F're Department
AC
Clea ing ouse
RPD
Abuttor.-
ice I PFD
BRA
As Chart 1 illustrates, the Clearing House is not actually
functioning as a clearing house for information on the conditions
of vacant buildings. Instead, the ISD receives much information
about vacant buildings directly from the City's eyes, while
information from community eyes is directed to ISD from the
Mayor's Office. Information and complaints about the conditions
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Group
of vacant buildings are directed to ISD, whose mandate is to
remedy nuisance conditions in buildings. The Clearing House,
although it was established to collect information about vacant
buildings, does not emerge as an information center. Even the
information the Clearing House will be receiving from the ABLJ in
their surveys conducted as part of the new Pilot Program will not
be direct information from City or community eyes.
Reguests for Develoment of Vacant Buildings:
Individuals or organizations seeking to develop a vacant
building generally call the Mayor's Office. If the building is
City-owned, the Mayor's office will contact the RPD or the PFD.
If the building is privately owned, then the Mayor's Office will
direct the interested party to the Clearing House.
According to Liz MacNeil, Director of the Clearing House,
when a citizen or community organization comes into the Clearing
House requesting information about vacant properties, her staff
provides them with tax status and ownership information. If the
building is City-owned and available for a negotiated sale, the
Clearing House staff will inform the party as to how to purchase
it in co-ordination with the RPD and the PFD. If the vacant
building is privately held, the Clearing House can only further
assist the interested party if the building is tax delinquent by
requesting prompt tax-title processing from the Tax-Title Office.
When a community development corporation has a homesteading
or other housing development program, it might not contact the
Clearing House or the. Mayor's Office, using instead communication
channels developed through years of experience in developing
housing with assistance from the City. For example, Roxbury
Multi-Service Center usually calls the PFD directly to inquire
about purchasing a vacant building to incorporate it into their
homesteading activities (Waters, 1986).
Chart 2: REQUESTS TO DEVELOP VACANT BUILDINGS
Investor Clearing
House
CDC
R D
Mayor 's
Communi ty Group Office PFD
Abuttor
As both Chart 1 and 2 illustrate, the ISD and the Mayor's
Office, rather than the Clearing House, function as parts of a
decentralized "clearing house" for information on the conditons
of vacant buildings and how to purchase and develop vacant
buildings.
D. Summary
By defining vacant buildings as abandoned buildings, or tax
delinquent buildings, the Property Disposition Committee shaped a
vacant building policy to reduce the rate at which owners abandon
property and to achieve the related goal of maximizing the City's
tax base. The primary way the City will meet these goals is to
resell tax-foreclosed buildings to new private owners who will
pay municipal real estate taxes. The ABU's Pilot Program
complements the C:ity's attempt to return abandoned buildings to
residential use by protecting them from irreparable damage. A
key component of implementing the new policy, the Clearing House
was created to co-ordinate the City's efforts to learn about
vacant buildings buildings and co-ordinate the City's disposition
process. However, the Clearing House was not intergrated into
the existing network circulating information about vacant
buildings to and around City Hall and, therefore, cannot operate
as a true clearing house.
III. EVALUATING BOSTON'S VACANT BUILDING POLICY
In this section I evaluate Boston's vacant building policy
in two ways. First, I show that the policy is a limited attempt
at returning vacant tax delinquent buildings to private owners.
In this discussion I do not challenge the policy goal, but
illuminate the weaknesses of the policy implementation. Second, I
criticize Boston's policy goal of returning abandoned buildings
to private owners. Both elements of my critique provide a basis
on which to recommend an alternative policy approach to reusing
vacant buildings as low income housing.
A. Drawbacks to the Policy's 1m21ementation
Boston's vacant building policy established mechanisms to
reduce the nuimber of abandoned buildings in the city and return
these buildings to tax-paying private owners in an effort to
increase the City's revenues from real estate taxes. The
specific mechanisms, while logical outcomes of the chosen policy
approach, were nriot institutionalized in such a way as to ensure
their actual support of the policy goal. Each mechanism could be
redirected to a goal of helping subsidize for profit development
of market-rate units out of tax foreclosed buildings by an
administration unsympathetic to Mayor Flynn's policy goals. For
the sake of discussion I break the policy's implementation
devices into four categories: property acquisition, information
collection, tax abatements, and negotiated sales process.
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Progerty Acguisition
The City must be able to swiftly foreclose on all tax
delinquent vacant buildings to then quickly sell them to private
tax-paying owners.(7) However, since the policy did not alter
the laws governing the tax-title foreclosure system or the way in
which Massachusetts and Boston administer the foreclosure system,
the City remains unable to quickly acquire vacant tax delinquent
buildings.
As a method of taking private property, the foreclosure
system must be sensitive to due process requirements of notice
and right to appeal. Four stages, as described in Appendix A,
compose the tax-title foreclosure process: tax-title taking,
petition to foreclose, final decree awarded to the City, and
previous owner's redemption period. At each stage, the owner has
the opportunity to clear the tax-title lien from the ownership
title.
Boston's policy only altered the final component of the
foreclosure process; while House Bill 6374 shortened the
redemption period for owners of vacant and abandoned property
from one year to 90 days, it did not shorten any legal time
elements of the process preceding the redemption period.
Currently, the foreclosure process can take as long as 2 1/2 to
13 years before a property actually reaches the redemption period
(APC, 1985; Globe, 2/13/85).
However, specific components of the process may be legally
changed to shorten the lengthy process of actually acquiring
7. Swiftly means foreclosing on tax delinquent property as soon
as possible and respect the rights of private property owners.
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clear title to tax delinquent property while protecting the
rights of private property owners. The City could have lobbied
the legislature to reduce from six months to two months the
required period between when a tax-title taking is recorded for
abandoned property and a petition to foreclose is filed by the
Tax-Title Office in the Land Court. New legislation could be
adopted to require title searches that review titles for the past
ten instead of twenty years to identify all parties interested in
abandoned properties (Section 65, Chapter 60 of the General
Laws). The legislature has shown its willingness to shorten the
legal process requirements of the foreclosure system by
shortening the redemption period for abandoned buildings.
Legally changing additional steps in the foreclosure process
would reduce the length of time Boston must wait to actually
foreclose on abandoned properties.
Yet, legislative changes alone will not speed the rate at
which the City can obtain clear title to tax delinquent vacant
buildings. According to Liz MacNeil, delays in the foreclosure
system result from inefficient administration of the process due
to a lack of adequate staffing in the Land Court. The Land
Court, much criticized for its lack of staff and antiquated
system of processing cases, remains unaltered by Flynn's policy
(Globe 2/17/66; Cunio, 1983:16, Knasas, 1984).
The City should lobby the legislature to increase the number
of judges sitting in the Land Court from one to three, and
appropriate additional funds for modernizing the system and
increasing the number of staff title examiners (Young, 1986;
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Globe 2/17/86).
The City's component of the tax-title system, the Tax-Title
Office, remains understaffed as well. Only one lawyer processes
cases in the Tax-Title Office (APC, 1985). Consequently, the
Tax-Title Office attorney exercises discretion in selecting those
tax-foreclosure cases, of all such cases ripe for processing,
that will be forwarded to the Land Court. Although the City has
designated vacant tax delinquent buildings as high priority items
for foreclosure petition processing, the City does not currently
know what buildings are still vacant and tax delinquent. The
burden of prioritizing vacant buildings for foreclosure
processing falls on the City, and the City has not updated the
NDEA survey's data on vacant tax delinquent buildings. Until,
and unless, the City actually collects the information necessary
to direct the Tax-Title Office in processing foreclosure cases,
the Tax-Title Office will retain the discretion it has
historically exercised in processing tax delinquent buildings
(APC, 1985). In addition, the City should increase the Tax-Title
Office's staff to complement the method of acquiring abandoned
buildings through tax-title foreclosure.
Information Collection
Although the Clearing House was created to collect and store
information on the characteristics of abandoned buildings, it
does not utilize the complaints on vacant buildings entering the
City from community or City eyes. This information is channeled
to ISD rather than to the Clearing House or the PFD. The policy
did not establish direct lines of communication from the
neighborhood to the City or from ISD to the Clearing House.
Instead of exploiting existing sources of information on vacant
buildings, such as the Fire Department, the APC, and the Police
Department, the Clearing House is currently proceeding to update
the data on vacant buildings by using RPD and PFD staff to
complete surveys (although now the ISD will give the Clearing
House the data on Dorchester's vacant buildings).
In relying on information at the Registry of Deeds or the
Assessors Office for data on what liens currently encumber vacant
properties' titles, the Clearing House's information base is
dated. The Registry of Deeds, which records all liens on
property titles, is approximately one year behind, while the
Collector-Treasurer's Office remains almost two years behind in
sending notice of a tax-title taking to the Registry of Deeds
(Welch, 1986).
If the Clearing House is to operate as an accurate database
on the characteristics of vacant buildings, the City should lobby
the State to increase funding for increased computerization and
staffing of the Registry of Deeds. The City must also rethink
how it is currently administering the Collector-Treasurer's
Office.
The City must also reevaluate the way information on vacant
buildings flows into City Hall. The Clearing House was not
integrated into the existing City bureaucracy in such a way as to
benefit from the information that the ISD and the Mayor's Office
collects on vacant buildings as a part of their operations. To
improve the way information flows to the Clearing House, the City
should consider making the Clearing House the central receiving
agency for all information on vacant buildings by increasing
public, community groups', and City departments' awareness on the
Clearing House's need for data on vacant buildings. The ABU's
co-operation with the Clearing House in the Pilot Program is a
first step in the direction of increasing intra-City department
co-ordination about vacant buildings. Second, the Clearing House
should hire a sufficient number of full-time community-liasons,
or "Vacant Building Managers", who will act as information
clearing houses and co-ordinators of City and community efforts
to sell foreclosed buildings and return them to residential use.
Vacant building managers could reform how information flows from
the community to the City and within City Hall. To compliment
the efforts of the vacant building managers, the ISD should hire
additional building inspectors who can feed the vacant building
managers with information on vacant buildings. Chart 3
illustrates how communication about vacant buildings could flow
more directly into the City and between City departments.
Chart 3: DIRECT FLOW OF INFORMATION ABOUT BOSTON'S
VACANT BUILDINGS
Building Inspectors Community Eyes
Vacant Building Managers
Clearing House- Mayor's Office
RPD -4 PFD
Tax Abatements
The new tax abatement law was developed to support the
policy goal of returning tax delinquent vacant buildings to
private owners. However, this law can potentially be used by a
pro-development administration to subsidize speculative
investment in tax delinquent buildings.
While the tax abatement program was designed to provide a
way to reduce the costs of rehabilitation for low income people,
the City can give private for-profit developers tax abatements as
well and essentially subsidize investment in risky real estate.
The burden for selecting who qualifies for tax abatements under
the new law falls on the City. While limiting the number of
units for which a for-profit developer may request abatements to
fifteen, the law could have also included mechanisms ensuring
that the abatements support the vacant building policy's
disposition criteria of selling foreclosed properties to persons
who will turn the property into affordable housing. For example,
the law could be amended to prevent the City from removing a tax-
title lien on abandoned property through abatement of back-taxes
unless the developer is actually a non-profit developer or a
resident whose median income falls below the city's average
income.
Neggtiated Sale Method of Property Disgosition
The negotiated sale method of property disposition is a
method of selling foreclosed property to private persons that
allows the City to select a low-bidder as a new owner if her
proposal meets community needs. However, it appears that the
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disposition process is not quickly selling properties to private
citizens. Out of the 139 properties advertized for sale in 1985,
only 16 were sold by the end of the year (CH, 1985).
In addition, community participation in the negotiated sales
process is still limited. Although the Residential Development
Program guidelines state that the negotiated sales process will
enable community participation in the process, the level of
community participation depends directly on whether or not the
City formally solicits input on development proposals from the
community. In the case of large properties, the City now
formally initiates community involvement in the disposition
process by holding community meetings. However, not all of the
City's foreclosed properties are large. For smaller properties,
the Clearing House distributes fliers to abuttors, requesting
them to contact the PFD if they have development needs they would
like the City to consider in selecting the proposal. But, the
selection committee does not include a community representative
who can ensure a community's input is actually considered in the
selection process. With a pro-development mandate, the selection
committee could ignore all community input to the process.
The community also participates in the negotiated sales
process by having community based organizations, such as CDC's,
submit proposals for development. In theory, a CDC, since it can
voice the development needs of the community that it serves,
should have a competitive advantage in the negotiated sales
process. However, because many community groups and CDC's to not
have funds to hire the expertise required to submit development
proposals and carry out an actual rehabilitation project, many
community groups are unable to participate in the negotiated
sales process by buying foreclosed properties from the City.
The City could reform the negotiated sales process to
include on the selection committee representatives from
neighborhoods who could ensure that the interests of the
neighborhoods are represented during the selection process. In
addition, the City should help fund the development activities of
Boston's CDCs so that these groups can fully participate in the
negotiated sales process.
The tools created to implement the City's vacant building
policy are limited because the responsibility for implementing
all aspects of the policy falls on the City. A Mayor
unsympathetic to the Flynn administration's approach to vacant
buildings could eliminate both the Clearing House and the
specific programs developed to implement the policy. Also.,
should the mandates for the Clearing House, the RPD, and the PFD
change, the programs created to facilitate the reuse of vacant
tax delinquent buildings as low income housing could be used to
subsidize speculative investment in these buildings.
Review:
Boston could achieve its policy goal of returning buildings
to tax-paying residents if the City reformed how the policy was
implemented. In summary, my recommendations are:
1. Reduce the time it takes the City to foreclose on tax-
delinquent vacant buildings:
Legal:
a. Shorten from six months to two months the period between
the tax-title taking and the filing of a petition to
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foreclose by the Tax-Title Office in the Land Court.
b. Reduce from 20 to 10 years the number of years back in
time required for a historical title search by the Land
CoLurt title examiners to tax-foreclose on vacant
buildings.
Administration:
a. Lobby the legislature to increase funding for the Land
Court to expand the number of Judges and staff title
examiners.
b. Increase the Staff at the Tax-Title Office.
c. Complete an annual vacant building survey to direct the
Tax-Title Office's processing of tax-foreclosure cases.
2. Improve the way in which information on vacant buildings flows
from the neighborhood to the City and within City Hall.
a. Hire a staff of vacant building managers to increase the
ability of the Clearing House to learn about vacant
buildings. The vacant building managers will compose a true
clearing house, acting as liasons between City and community
eyes and City Departments.
b. Lobby the State to increase funding for modernizing the
Registry of Deeds.
c. Increase the staff and funding of the Collector-
Treasurer's Office.
3. Amend the law allowing the City to abate back taxes to new
private owners of vacant and tax delinquent buildings to allow
only this type of abatement to non-profit developers and
residents whose income falls below the city's average income
level.
4. Reform the negotiated sales process to increase the level of
community participation.
a. Include community representatives on the selection
committee.
b. Fund CDCs to enable these community-based developers to
participate in the negotiated sales process by submitting
competitive proposals.
Many of these recommendations have been suggested by others
as methods of either increasing the ability of the City to
foreclose on tax delinquent buildings or injecting community
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participation into the planning process for tax-foreclosed
buildings. Clearly, the City was not willing to incorporate
these kinds of mechanisms into the vacant building policy I have
described. For whatever reason the City was unwilling to use
such tools, the City's decision makers may be more willing to
reconsider how the policy was implemented if they believe that
such an action would increase the popularity of the Flynn
administration. Therefore, the citizens of Boston who agree with
the PDC's policy goal must actively demonstrate to the City that
improvements to the policy implementation, such as those that I
have suggested, will help the City achieve its goal of increasing
real estate tax revenue.
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B. Criticism of The Policy Goal
But all of these improvements to how the vacant building
policy is implemented may ultimately prove counter productive to
another important goal of the Flynn administration--increasing
the amount of affordable housing opportunities for the city's low
income residents. By supporting a return of tax-foreclosed and
tax delinquent buildings to tax-paying private owners, the City
is ultimately supporting the gentrification of abandoned
neighborhoods, a process which results in a loss of these
communities' low income housing.
The way Boston thinks about vacant buildings has led to a
policy of returning vacant foreclosed property to private for-
profit owners. By seeing only abandoned buildings as vacant
buildings, the policy considers vacant buildings only as
discarded property that does not generate tax revenues. Vacant
tax delinquent buildings represent disinvestment in property and
a loss of tax revenues, but if the City does not foreclose on
these buildings, they can be avenues through which neighborhoods
are transformed from low income communities to upper income
enclaves.
Because the City did not increase the legal or
administrative capacity to foreclose on tax-delinquent vacant
buildings and Boston's real estate market is booming, the City
cannot actually foreclose on tax delinquent vacant buildings
before speculators purchase them (MacNeil, 1986; Martin, 1986;
Young, 1986; Berman, 1986). Once speculators purchase vacant tax
delinquent buildings, clear their titles by either paying off the
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back-tax bills or requesting an abatement under the new tax
abatement legislation, and hold them while paying the current
real estate taxes, the buildings cannot be foreclosed by the
City. In addition, these buildings become increasingly more
valuable as speculative sales increase their market values. They
are then lost as a source of affordable housing.
Abandonment Crisis In a Renewing Cit?
To Boston's policy makers, the meaning of vacant buildings
comes from the neighborhoods in which they most often exist--
declining neighborhoods. Boston's vacant building policy clearly
reflects the way in which urbanists studying central cities in
the 1970s defined vacant buildings. For these urban theorists,
vacant buildings were defined by tax delinquency and owner
abandonment.
Urbanists studying the phenomena of inner city property
abandonment in the 1960s and 1970s found that in declining areas
vacant buildings were abandoned by their owners because little
foreseeable market for central city real estate existed
(Sternlieb, 1970).
The number of abandoned structures has never
realistically been (tabulated)...there is a list of
structures reported vacant....based on vacancy...
upward of 100,000 apartment units (are) now vacant and
abandoned.
-George Sternlieb, 1970
Testimony to the U.S. Senate Sub-
Committee on Housing and Urban Affairs
Tax delinquency was virtually synonymous with abandonment
(Sternlieb, 1973:257). Owners ceased real estate tax payments to
a municipality soon after deciding to abandon a building
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(Sternlieb, 1970).
Boston' s vacant building pol i cy reflects a mi spercepti on
about the city's current urban development. Large scale property
abandonment occurred in Boston's inner city neighborhoods in the
1960s and 1970s, a symptom of decreasing central city real estate
values in the face of surging suburban land values (Spain &
Laska, 1980). Urban land values shifted in response to
transformations in the region's economy; Boston's inner city land
values fell as the region lost a significant portion of its
manufacturing firms to the southeast, including many textile
firms which had historically driven Boston's ecomony (Gordon,
1984).
Approximately five percent of the South End's housing stock
was legally abandoned in 1970, after twenty years of continuous
capital disinvestment in Boston's manufacturing and commercial
sectors reduced the value of inner city real estate (Finance
Commission of Boston, 1970). In 1978 almost two percent of all
of Boston's dwellings was abandoned, or 4,100 housing units
(Burchell & Litoskin, 1981:35).
While Boston's vacant building policy targets those vacant
buildings owned by persons who do not pay real estate taxes, not
aIl vacant buildings in the city are tax delinquent. The NDEA^
survey of vacant buildings revealed that only 48 percent of the
800 vacant buildings in Boston are tax delinquent (PFD, 1986).
Of the 107 vacant buidings identified by NDEA around Dudley
Station in Roxbury, 50 percent are tax delinquent, 36 percent are
not tax delinquent and 14 percent are owned by the City, mostly
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the BRA (NDEA, 1985). In East Boston, only two of the twenty-
three vacant residential buildings are tax delinquent (NDEA,
1985).
What do the non-tax delinquent vacant buildings in these
neighborhoods mean? Speculators hold these buildings not to
operate as rental property or to live in, but for a profitable
sale. Vacant non-tax delinquent buildings cannot be addressed in
the existing policy because they are privately held and not
subject to foreclosure.
The policy also fails to recognize that not all tax
delinquent buildings, whether vacant or occupied, have been
legally abandoned by their owners. During each stage of the tax-
title foreclosure process--tax-title taking--petition to
forec:lose--final decree--owner's redemption period--a tax
delinquent owner has the opportunity to clear her property title
of the tax-title lien. When a tax delinquent owner clears her
property's tax-title, the owner reclaims the property. To clear
a title, the owner may pay off all taxes owned to the City,
request a tax abatement or a long term payment plan, or challenge
and overturn a a Land Court foreclosure ruling to redeem her
interest in the property.
Only 1,838 of the 3,161 tax-title takings of Boston property
recorded at the Registry of Deeds reached the petition to
foreclose stage of the tax-title process in FY 1984 (APC, 1985).
Of these, the Land Court awarded the City only 167 final
foreclosure decrees. Eventually, the City actually gained clear
title to only 48 of these properties (APC, 1985).
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Reflecting Thecries of NeighbrhEood Change of the 197s:
Residential abandonment is the end product of all the
urban ills of our society.
-George Sternlieb, 1970
Boston's vacant building policy is an example of a public
policy guided by a theory that all neighborhoods eventually
decline. Theories of neighborhood change, depicting stages
through which neighborhoods pass on the way to being littered
with abandoned and vacant buildings, lead to public polices
subsidizing private reinvestment in deteriorated urban areas.
Boston's policy, in attempting to sell vacant tax-foreclosed
buildings to private owners, reflects this view. The policy
fails to realize that the redevelopment activities, which
transformed central city land values, have renewed the
profitability of inner city residential neighborhoods and vacant
and tax delinquent buildings.
During the 1970s the literature on neighborhood change
described the life cycle of inner city neighborhoods as a process
of declining health and vitality. Disinvestment in inner city
neighborhoods during this time created a stock of legally
abandoned buildings.
There are two broad models of neighborhood change, one based
on neoclassical economics and one grounded in political economy.
Here I summarize the life cycle theories arising out of each
school to show how Boston's attempt at breaking the city's cycle
of property abandonment' reflects the 1970's theories of how
cities change. Life cycle theories of neighborhood change are
also referred to as Stage Theories because they describe stages
through which all neighborhoods pass (Birch, 1971:78). Although
each school presents distinct analyses and solutions to the
problem of declining neighborhoods, the stage theories presented
by both conventional and radical urbanists assume neighborhoods
inevitably decline and become marred by abandoned buildings.
Conventional life cycle theories borrow from the field of
ecology, analyzing the life of a neighborhood using organic
metaphors to describe the natural aging of the built environment.
Neighborhoods age as all living organisms do; these theories
assume the death of a neighborhood is inevitable (Weiler, 1983
:167). Incorporating neoclassical economic principals, life
cycle theorists determine an area's supply and demand for housing
by measuring indicators such as demographic changes, household
perceptions, and building conditions. These theories also assume
that an unlimited supply of new or better quality housing exists
for upper income residents who move up and out of older
neighborhoods (Kolodny, 1983).
Conventional theories of neighborhood change imply, if they
do not explicity propose, that housing resources "trickle down"
from higher to lower income groups. This "filtering" process,
according to some, is how the market provides a source of low
income housing (Gale, 1984:9). As buildings age naturally, their
market value declines and their availablity to lower income
persons increases. The denouement of the filtering process is
abandonment--as the buildings age they completely deteriorate
until the property no longer has economic value as determined by
the market. Abandonment is the inevitable result of the natural
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filtering process (Burchell & Litoskin, 1961:16).
Most life cycle theories begin by describing a viable or
healthy community, one in which the market operates efficiently
as the area begins its growth process (Table 1). A series of
unstable real estate market conditions, usually caused by an
"invasion" of new residents, eventually creates a dense and
deteriorated neighborhood. In each theory, decline is
inevitable; death or abandonment is usually the final stage in
the life cycle.
Erickson draws upon an ecological theory of how change
occurs in urban neighborhoods (Lurie, 1980).(8) Decline occurs
when upper income residents leave a neighborhood due to changing
preferences for living space. This produces market instability
followed by invasion of "immigrants". In the final stage, after
a series of invasions and competition for the built environment,
the old group leaves the area for greener pastures, and the new
group becomes dominant (Lurie, 1980). As the income and the
social status of the area's residents decline, the physical
conditions of the neighborhood also deteriorate and the housing
stock filters to people with progressively lower incomes.
Hoover and Vernon's theory assumes that preferences for
housing and social environments change as households progress
through the family life cycle (Hoover & Vernon, 1959:185-96).
For example, in the Thinning Out stage, household size decreases
due to children leaving home. In the Transition stage densities
8. The process at work in nature and in cities are Invasion,
Competition, Dominance, and Succession.
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Table 1: STAGE THEORIES OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE
Stage:
HEALTHY------------------------------------------------------------------ABANDONMENT-------RENEWAL
Erickson
Hoover &
Vernon
Birch
Rhlbrandt &
Brophy
Smith
Stable Population
Efficient Market
Residential
Development
Rural
Healthy &
Viable
New
Construction
Wealthy Exit
Market Imbalance
Transition
First Wave of
Development
Incipient
Decline
Landlord
Control
Immigrants
Invade
Downgrad i ng
Full
Development
Clearly
Declining
Block
Busting
Old Population
Leaves
Thinning Out
Thinning
Rapidly
Declining
Redl ining
Change in
Community Status
Renewal
Recapture
Abandonment
Abandonment
Sources: Ahlbrandt & Brophy, 1975; Birch, 1971; Kolodny, 1983;
Lurie, 1980; Smith, 1979a
Theorist:
o-s
ON
increase and blacks replace whites as the area declines (Birch,
1971). While this theory does not include a stage of
neighborhood death, death must occur because "renewal" is the
last stage in the life cycle.
Birch's stage theory of neighborhood change also predicts a
process of neighborhood decline, although the life cycle
culminates in a "recapture" or renewal phase of development. In
the Recapture stage, "the land occupied by an old slum becomes
too valuable to justify its use as an old slum, and its
inhabitants become too weak politically to hold on to it" (Birch,
1977).
Ahlbrandt and Brophy's theory is the most fatalistic; they
see decline as inevitable and equate decline and abandonment
(Kolodny, 1963). Not only are selected buildings legally
abandoned in this stage, but the entire neighborhood suffers from
large scale disinvestment.
Smith has developed a stage theory based on political
economy (Smith, 1979a). To Smith, real property is a commodity
in the capitalist system, where property owners, investors,
mortgage lenders, and other owners of capital seek to maximize
profit (Smith, 1979b:540)). The stages of his theory reflect the
myriad disinvestment decisions of those controlling the real
estate market. These decisions eventually result in
unprofitability--inability of property owners to obtain
refinancing, rents, and cash from sale of property (Smith &
LeFaivre, 1984:49). Smith's stage theory simply outlines the
processes occurring when capital is devalued, a process referred
to as "filtering" by neoclassical economists (Smith, 1979b:545).
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As in the conventional stage theories, decline ends with
abandonment, when buildings can no longer be used profitably
(Smith, 1979b:545),
Stage theories of neighborhood change illuminate the type of
neighborhood in which vacant and abandoned buildings persisted in
the 1970s. Abandonment is the last stage of a neighborhood's
life, a life ending naturally with disinvestment, decay, and
death (London, 1980:18).
While Boston's vacant building policy recognizes that
abandoned, or vacant and tax delinquent buildings persist in
abandoned areas of the city, it does not recognize the role
played by these buildings in the neighborhood renewal process.
The policy fails to confront the current urban renewal process
currently transforming many of Boston's previously abandoned
central city neighbor-hoods.
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Vacant Buildings in Boston's Renewing Neighbtohoods:
People are looking to pick up these dilapidated
buildings due to Boston's hot real estate market.
-Leo F. Martin, 1966
Deputy Commissioner
Building Department, Boston
Some of Boston's inner city neighborhoods have been
gentrifying since the mid 1960s, continuing the central city
renewal process which began with Federally sponsored urban
renewal programs in the 1960s. In the renewal process low income
areas that have suffered from disinvestment for years have become
transformed by public and private capital investment that has led
to gentrification. in this process, speculators purchase tax
delinquent vacant buildings as the neighborhood's real estate
values increase (Marcuse, 1985:223). Thus, vacant tax delinquent
buildings are avenues through which speculators accelerate the
gentrification process (Smith, 1979b).
As in declining areas, vacant buildings in gentrifying areas
are unused housing resources. However, vacant buildings that are
held for future sale in a gentrifying area cannot be acquired by
the City through tax-title foreclosure because they are not tax
delinquent. Boston's policy does not allow the City to acquire
vacant tax delinquent buildings in neighborhoods before their
values increase, nor has it directed existing mechanisms that
enable the City to acquire and/or control the use of vacant
buildings once they have been purchased by speculative investors
and are no longer tax, delinquent.
In a city, like Boston, that has a lack of affordable
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housing available to low income residents, the City has not
chosen to tailor the vacant building policy to help meet this
housing need. I suggest that the City may have included as one
of its vacant building policy goals expanding the supply of
affordable housing if it had explored how changes in the urban
environment affect who owns and maintains or neglects vacant
buildings.
Table 2 is a way to summarize how ownership and property
conditions change as the neighborhood surrounding the property
changes.
Table 2: HOW NEIGHBORHOOD STAGES CORRESPOND TO CHANGES IN WHO
OWNS BUILDINGS AND HOW THEY ARE USED
NEIGHBORHOOD:
Stable
BUILDING:
Occupied
Abandoned
Vacant and
Abandoned
Vacant
Declining
Abandoned
Transition
Gentrified Rehabilitated &
Occupied
OWNER:
Owner-Occupant
Legal Owner
Unclear
Public Owner
Speculator
Investor
Boston's Current Urban Reality: Revitalization of Profitability
A community that has been bled dry of its wealth is now
faced with a flood of investment which can affect it as
drastically and as brutally as the last forty years
of drought.
-Gaston & Kennedy, 1985
Neither Boston as a whole nor most of its inner city
neighborhoods currently remain in the declining stage of a life
cycle. Economic growth and public policies subsidizing
reinvestment of private capital in inner city real estate have
regenerated the profitability of the citys real estate. Since
the 1950s, Boston's central city land values have increased due
to transformations in the urban economy, including a growing
regional high technology economy. Housing prices in the Boston
area increased by thirty-eight percent during 1985 alone (Globe,
2/21/86; Globe 3/29/86c). Not all of Boston's neighborhoods are
experiencing such dramatic increases in real estate values; some
areas, like parts; of Roxbury, remain dominated by vacant and
abandoned buildings. These areas seem to have little potential
for future investment and increased land values. However, the
predominant urban process that is visibly transforming the urban
environment today is the process of physical renewal.
Urban renewal was the foremost public policy to reform inner
city land values. Beginning with the clearance of the West End
in 1959, Boston's urban redevelopment program transformed the
land values of the CBD by subsidizing private investment in the
decayed downtown. Urban renewal funds provided public
infrastructure and other facilities for the corporations
requiring downtown locations (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1983).
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Many of Boston's neighborhoods have been, or are currently
being, transformed by the renewed profitability of downtown's real
estate. The South End's transformation from a largely poor black
community in the 1950s to a racially mixed upper income area by
the 1980s exemplifies the effect of publicly subsidized private
investment near a poor neighborhood (Auger, 1979). Today, the
Dudley Station area of Roxbury, for decades the center of the
poor black community in Boston, is the target for $750 million in
private and public investment--an influx of capital that has
induced speculation in many of the Dudley area's vacant
buildings (Gaston & Kennedy, 1985; Realtor: Foster & Foster, 1986;
Cherry, 1986). This massive investment in the Dudley Station
Area is a component of the BRA's plan to force downtown
developers to invest in areas, like Dudley Station, which have
historically suffered from disinvestment (Globe, 3/29/66; Boston
Business Journal, 2/86).
Speculation is a strong accompaniment of
gentrification. The behavior of speculators, and the
real estate market generally, is perhaps the single
most sensitive indicator of the type of change
occurring in a neighborhood.
-Marcuse, 1985
Gentrification is not distinguished by the fact that
capital is invested where once there was none;
speculators are notoriously active immediately before a
neighborhood undergoes gentrification.
-Smith, 1979a
Vacant non-tax delinquent buildings signal a transformation
of the value of a community's real estate through the
5'2
gentrification process. Vacant buildings persist in gentrifying
areas because they can be profitabley held and sold. Property
values increase due to market appreciation alone, attracting many
investors and speculators. Therefore, a vacant building in a
renewing area indicates that a speculator is holding a previously
inexpensive housing unit, which she expects will become
relatively expensive prior to resale (Hartman, 1981:28). When
this occurs, the community has lost an affordable shell which
could have been rehabilitated into low income housing.
Gentrification: The Transformation of Abandoned Neighborhoods
The gentrification process results in a class-based shift in
who owns a community; the neighborhood becomes oriented to and
dominated by newcomers of greater wealth than the old residents
(Lang, 1982:8). Many studies describe the gentrification
process as one in which upper income residents displace lower
income residents (Pattison, 1977; Gale, 1984; Marcuse, 1985). In
a gentrified area, the new residents may or may not own real
estate in the community; however, both owners and residents are
from upper income classes.
Gentrification occurs in neighborhoods that have suffered
from disinvestment by individual property owners and institutions
in the final stage of neighborhood change--the abandonment stage.
Abandoned neighborhoods can be characterized by three conditions
which lead to their transformation by the gentrification process:
an undervalued stock of real estate, proximity to the newly
revitalized central city, and an urban redevelopment policy which
supports investment in those areas having the prior two
5 3,
characteristics (Smith, 1984). Vacant and abandoned buildings
are located in areas with these three characteristics.
Precondition of Gentrification: Undervalued Real Estate
Gentrification occurs in areas suffering from severe
disinvestment; currently declining neighborhoods are gentrified
communities of the future (Smith, 1979a). Clay's study
documenting the characteristics of the renewal process in over
100 U.S. cities supports this analysis; his data show that
gentrifying neighborhoods often contain housing with serious
structural problems or some evidence of abandonment (Clay,
1983:25). Smith goes beyond Clay's study, analyzing the
microeconomics of why reinvestment in depopulated and disinvested
neighborhoods can be profitable.
Smith analyzes urban change from a Marxist perspective,
arguing that the economic, social, and political characteristics
of the larger capitalist society are manifest in the process of
gentrification (Smith, 1979b:540). To Smith, land and buildings
are commodities as well as centers of both production and
consumption geared towards reproduction of society. For example,
residential buildings are not just homes, but goods produced and
used as a source of profit for capital (Smith, 1984:44).
Smith recognizes that while land and buildings are fixed in
space, their value is not. When a neighborhood suffers from
disinvestment, its capital stock depreciates; the land and
buildings become devalued as capital leaves in search of more
profitable locations. However, an extremely undervalued parcel
of real estate has the potential of being a highly profitable
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investment if the market will value the parcel higher in the
future.
Smith sees gentrification as an extention of the process of
decline (Smith, 1984). Devaluation of the physical environment
creates the potential for renewal. Gentrification occurs in
abandoned areas precisely because real property is undervalued in
these neighborhoods (Smith, 1984:50).
Close to the CBD: Close to Urban Renewal
Heavy private investment in formally declining urban
centers occurs when the relative future value of the
core is enhanced...
-Fainstein 84 Fainstein, 1983
Gentrification occurs in communities which have not only
been abandoned, but are targets for capital investment (Marcuse,
1985). Proximity to capital investment, such as being near
redevelopment areas, can be a sufficient precondition for
gentrification. Clay discovered that gentrification occurred in
relatively old areas located within two miles of central cities
(Clay, 1979 & 1980). Gentrification occurs in neighborhoods near
the CBD that were not cleared by urban renewal programs. In the
1980s, these neighborhoods are close to the transformed core
areas.
In this process...there is domination of a
territory by upper-class owners and speculative
investors (who force) up the exchange values of
surrounding properties even without expenditures in
rehabilitation to make them intrinsically more
valuable; where rehabilitaion does occur, the new
price far exceeds the cost of improvement.
-Fainstein & Fainstein, 1983
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Vacant Buildings: Land in Transition Held by Speculators
When land that's sat idly by for anything from months
to generations suddenly gets transformed from wasteland
(or headache) to money-making development--that's
TRANSITION. That's also a killing in the market for
the smart investor who made the deal.
-Joseph A. Conover, 1975
How to Make Big Erfits From
Land in Transition
Speculators, like capital, flow to where the return on
investment is highest. They engage in risky investments for
quick and considerable profit (Goetze, 1983:102). Speculators
maximize profit from investments in real estate by owning land
only during transition periods, when land is passing from non-use
to use or from limited use to higher and better use (Conover,
1975:308; Lindeman, 1976:143). The neighborhood context produces
the conditions of profitability; if a speculator buys and sells
in a rising real estate market she can receive windfall profits
upon sale of property bought when it was relatively undervalued
by the market (Conover, 1975:308).
Houses purchased as short-term investments are usually
either rented on a month-to-month basis or left vacant
while the property appreciates in value.
-Cunningham, 1978
A vacant building is a prime target for a real estate
speculator--a vacant building is an almost costless type of
property to hold. A tenantless building is a cheap building to
operate, requiring no heat and utilites and only minimal
maintenance and boarding up. Although a vacant building may be
an easy target for arsonists and vandals, the building portion of
a property is not what makes it a target to a speculator; the
land portion, or the relative location of the property to public
and private investment, is the part of the parcel which becomes
valuable in a transitional neighborhood. In addition, should the
speculator turn developer and decide to rennovate the building,
no tenants exist to either evict or challenge the owner.
C. Summary
By not analyzing how vacant tax delinquent buildings become
the focus for speculative activity in transitional neighborhoods,
the City fails to realize that it must not only quickly foreclose
on tax delinquent vacant buildings, attempt to acquire vacant and
non-tax delinquent buildings and regulate how investors use these
buildings.
Boston's vacant building policy intervenes in the process of
neighborhood decline by foreclosing on abandoned buildings in the
declining stage of the life cycle. The City's attempt to more
quickly foreclose on vacant and tax delinquent buildings is a
logical way to seize, before speculators can, tax delinquent
vacant buildings in transitional neighborhoods. However, the
City's policy did not alter the tax-title foreclosure process in
order to facilitate quick acquisition of property. Therefore, in
the context of Boston's rising real estate values, the City will
be unable to acquire vacant tax delinquent buildings before
speculators, who resell such buildings for inflated prices and
prevent them from being turned into affordable housing. Yet, in
selling those buildings which it can foreclose to private owners
the City contributes to the gentrification
and thus to a loss of low income housing.
building policy attempts to expand the tax
example of a public policy that leads to a
affordable housing.
of poor neighborhoods,
While Boston's vacant
base, it is also an
shrinking supply of
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IV. A NEW POLICY APPROACH
I propose a new policy approach to return vacant and tax
delinquent buildings to residential use. The City's priority
should be increasing Boston's supply of low income housing rather
than maximizing real estate tax revenues. Instead of
transferring ownership of foreclosed property to the private for-
profit owners, the City should remove these properties from
Boston's speculative market by donating them to a community-based
land trust. By co-ordinating the rehabilitation through
community development corporations, a land trust will protect
these properties for low income housing development, reduce
the rate at which abandoned neighborhoods gentrify, and return
tax delinquent buildings to tax-paying status.
Currently the City is unable to foreclose rapidly on vacant
or occupied tax delinquent property within the tax-title
foreclosure system. Therefore, I suggest ways the City can
acquire property to facilitate a land trust's activities, or
those of a land bank. However, the City's efforts to increase
the amount of low income housing in Boston should not stop here.
The City should also institute development and land use controls
to regulate who benefits from the transformation of abandoned
neighborhoods by the gentrification process. I conclude this
section with a discussion of existing property regulations that
have been tested in other cities as legal methods of controlling.
who benefits from transformations in the urban system.
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A. The Citywide Land Trust
To the individual goes the fruit of individual labor;
to the community goes the social increment.
-Davis, 1964
By transferring tax-foreclosed properties to a land trust,
the City can protect the low cost of vacant tax delinquent
buildings in abandoned neighborhoods and reduce the amount of
low income housing lost to speculators as these communities
gentrify.
The opportunity to include a land trust in the
implementation of such a policy exists. A Citywide Land Trust
(CWLT) is currently forming in Boston. The founding members
compose various CDC's and community organizations particularly
concerned with the way the city's development affects the housing
opportunities of its low income residents. The primary goal of
the Citywide Land Trust is to intervene in Boston's speculative
housing market by withholding property from the market and to
assist CDCs develop low and moderate income housing (Flionis,
1985).
How does the Land Trust Work?:
A land trust is a non-profit corporation explicitly created
to ensure the long term use of property for the benefit of the
community (Flionis, 1965). A land trust retains ownership to the
land portion of real property, allowing individuals purchasing
its buildings to own only the value of the capital they invest in
the building portion of the entire parcel. Land trusts have been
designed with Henry George's philosophy of land ownership in
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ind--that individuals create value in property by investing
capital in improvements to land, while society produces the
balance of a property's appreciation in market price (Carey
1976:267). Society creates value in a property when private and
public capital is invested in surrounding properties and
neighborhoods and in infrastructure (Davis, 1984:210). The value
of a property is not only its material worth, but the social
value conferred to it by virtue of its location in relation to
other types of capital investments (Carey, 1976:257). The land
portion of the property includes relative location, which bestows
upon property much of its speculative value.
A land trust, in retaining full or partial interest in
property, can remove from the speculative market the quality of
property which makes real estate a valuable investment. If a
land trust can acquire property, especially vacant and tax
delinquent buildings in abandoned neighborhoods, it can then
prevent speculation on these properties and thereby mitigate the
effects of the renewal of abandoned neighborhoods.
A land trust protects the land portion of a property's value
by retaining title to or a partial interest in property. A land
trust leases the land portion of property to private individuals
or to community development corporations in long term, renewable,
and often inheritable lease agreements. The building component
of a property is either rented, leased, or purchased from the
trust. When a building is purchased from the land trust, the
trust or a third party establishes a conventional mortgage
agreement with the buyer. The trust protects its interest in the
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property by holding a first option on buying back the building.
A3l real estate taxes levied against property held by a land
trust are paid by residents living in the buildings.
When a land trust does not exercise its first right to
purchase a building, the resident-owner may sell the building,
but at a controlled resale price below the building's market
value. The resale price is the original cost to the seller
adjusted by an inflation indicator, minus the value of
depreciation and damage, plus the value of any improvements to
the property during the ownership period. Therefore, any value
created in the property by the changes in the larger society,
other than general inflation, remains with the land trust. The
trust can then resell housing at below market rates and enable
low income people to rent or purchase housing they would not be
able to in the private market.
The City's Role:
The City has two roles in working with the CWLT: acquiring
property on behalf of the land trust and funding the operation of
land trust. The City can legally take property using two
mechanisms, the power to foreclose on property for non-payment of
real estate taxes and the power of eminent domain.
Tax-Title Foreclosure:
The City could donate tax-foreclosed property to the CWLT.
The cost to the City of foreclosing on delinquent property is the
the administration costs of the foreclosure process. However, by
selling foreclosed property to private owners and abating back
taxes to private purchasers of unforeclosed tax delinquent
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properties under- the current policy, the City may not transfer
the value of these costs to its low income residents. (9) An
additional cost to the City of donating tax-foreclosed
property to a land trust is the foregone revenue from
a negotiated sale.
Eminent Domain:
The City should also explore the use of eminent domain
powers as a method of acquiring vacant properties for the CWLT>s
activities. The City may take property in an attempt to protect
the public welfare. Although the right to use private property
for individual gain constitutes one of the supreme individual
rights guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, land is part of a
collective good which the Courts recognize must be regulated to
further the general welfare of society (Coomes, 1985). Imbedded
in the doctrine of eminent domain is the philosophy that the
ultimate owner of land is society as a whole (Caldwell,
1974:762). Eminent domain powers may be invoked by government to
acquire property to further what the government believes are
local needs. This may include
neighborhood preservation, protecting affordable housing, and
redistributing land ownership (Coomes, 1985).
9. The City also places liens on property for costs incurred by
the ISD to board up and repair vacant and dilapidated buildings.
However, the City does not currently foreclose on these
properties unless they are also in tax arrears (Young, Weinerman,
1986). However, similar to foreclosures on tax-title liens, the
judicial process to foreclose on ISD liens remains lengthy.
Consequently, the City will not foreclose on these buildings,
especially since all City-liens must be paid off before a title
is legally transferred to a new owner. The City only forecloses
on buildings in tax arrears (Young, 1986).
Berman vs. Parker (1954) set the legal precedent for cities
to use eminent domain powers in controlling urban development
through urban renewal plans (348 U.S. 26). Redistributing
ownership of land has also been upheld by the Supreme Court as a
legitimate public purpose. In Hawaii Housing Authgrity vs.
Midkiff (1964) the Court upheld the use of eminent domain by the
Housing Authority to reduce the extreme concentration of property
ownership in Hawaii, concluding that redistributing property
ownership was seen as a compelling public need (Si L Ed 2d 186).
The City of Cambridge has legislated the use of eminent
domain to protect the housing opportunities of its lower income
residents (Tab, 2/25/66). Its Full Occupancy Ordinance, an
amendment to the City's rent control regulations, enables the
City to take by eminent domain rental units and buildings which
remain vacant without good cause. This legislation attempts to
serve the public purpose of meeting the city's high need for
rental housing.
Boston should enable the Public Facilities Department, which
has powers of eminent domain, to acquire all property left vacant
for over a specified number of days without proof of good cause.
Instead of using the PFD to acquire proerty only for public
institutions, the City should expand the scope of the PFD's
powers to include acquiring property to further the City's new
goal of transferring vacant and tax delinquent buildings to the
Citywide Land Trust.
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Obstacles to City Acquisition of Property:
The City is limited in using the power of eminent domain
to take vacant tax delinquent property and vacant non-tax
delinquent property because it must compensate owners of property
taken through eminent domain in accordance with the fifth
Amendment. Currently, the City does not have the financial
resources to acquire property. The cost of taking tax delinquent
property through eminent domain is the market value of the
property minus the value of the foregone taxes. The cost of
taking non-tax delinquent vacant buildings is the property's
market value.
Despite the lack of City funds to acquire land, the land
trust can still acquire property on its own. As a non-profit
corporation, a trust can accept tax deductible donations of full
or partial interests in property. In this way, an economic
liability to an owner becomes an income tax benefit. To an owner
who cannot sell in the private for-profit market his property
that is located in a disinvested and depopulated neighborhood,
donating the property to a land trust is an opportunity to
receive a income tax benefit. for a portion of the economic value
of the property to the land trust. The land trust will accept
property of low economic value because it recognizes the social,
or non-economic value of property.
Unfortunately, the land trust's ability to acquire vacant
property in transitional neighborhoods will be limited by how
valuable the property in these areas becomes in the process of
renewal. The rising value of residential real estate in Boston's
inner city means that tax deductions may not be able to compete
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with cash investment returns of fifty and sixty percent (Young,
1986; Globe 2/22/86).
However, the City may be able to contribute information,
funding and technical expertise to further the CWLT's other
activities. For example, Dallas refers its land trust, Common
Ground, to tax delinquent property owners in order to facilitate
the trust's effectiveness at finding potential donors. Although
Boston's Clearing House has referred private investors to tax
delinquent owners in the hope that a new, tax-paying owner would
buy the delinquent property, the City could make it a policy to
provide to the land trust free updated information on tax
delinquent owners and how much back taxes they owe the City.
Currently, CDCs must pay the Clearing House $100 for a
computerized printout of tax and ownership information on each
BRA planning area (Sanborn, 1986).
The City could help fund the CWLT's property acquisition and
development activities. The City of Burlington, Vermont, for
example, contributed City staff time as well as $200,000 in seed
money to the Burlington Land Trust. Funding a land trust
increases its ability to acquire properties for full market value
or through bargain sales which gives an owner cash as well as a
tax benefit for selling property at below market rates (Clark,
1985). In addition to funding the land trust, Burlington gives
first priority to BLT properties in the city's various
rehabilitation programs (CEDO, Burlington).
The Citywide Land Trust has been set up by community-based
organizations to serve the housing needs of the city's low income
residents. Boston must gather the political will and financial
resources to create a partnership with the CWLT if it is to help
mitigate the effects of the gentrification of Boston's abandoned
neighborhoods.
B. Land Banking as an Alternative to the Land Trust
The land bank allows communities to harness the
economic vitality they are experiencing to protect what
is good in their town.
- Kelly McClintock, Director
Environmental Lobby of Massachusetts
Since the City may be unwilling to fund property acquisition
for the CWLT, Boston should consider lobbying for State
legislation enabling a Boston Land Bank with powers of eminent
domain and a funding source for the land bank's activities. A
Boston Land Bank with the power of eminent domain could take
property to meet a public need. As quasi-governmental state
agencies in the United States, land banks hold property out of
the private market to allow for its planned development.
Most land banks in the United States and Europe have been
granted power of eminent domain to facilitate land acquistion
(Strong, 1979). France's land banking system relies on "the
Public right to pre-empt private land sales", as do the national
systems in Sweden and the Netherlands. In 1970, the Rhode Island
Industrial Land Development Corporation Act authorized the
creation of semi-public corporations empowered to use eminent
domain to acquire land for industrial land banks (Strong, 1979).
Currently two land banks operate in Massachusetts, the
Massachusetts Government Land Bank (MGLB) and the Nantucket Land
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Bank (NLB). Nantucket's Land Bank, the first of its kind in the
nation, uses the power of eminent domain to acquire open space
and protect the island community from uncontrolled land
development and speculation (Globe, 10/27/85). The land bank is
funded by a two percent transfer tax imposed on the sale of all
real estate, as authorized by the Land Bank Enabling Act for
Barnstable County (Draft Enabling Legislation, NLB).
A transfer tax for Suffolk County, which includes Boston,
has been brought before the State Committee on Taxation. Bill
13076 has been introduced on request from the Flynn administration
as part of a housing bill to finance affordable housing
production (Jankowski, 1986). As a source of funding a
combination of both open space acquisition and low income
housing, the tax seeks to tap into the city's speculative market
to produce what the private market fails to (Globe, 3/13/86). If
such a transfer tax was imbedded in a land bank enabling act that
also authorized eminent domain powers, the City could use
transfer tax funds to acquire both tax delinquent and non-tax
delinquent vacant property in abandoned neighborhoods.
Massachusetts' land bank, the Government Land Bank (MGLB),
was established in 1975 to hold and redevelop Federal military
bases evacuated in the 1970s. Legislation in 1979 allowed the
Land Bank to also develop state surplus property and property in
cities and towns found to be substandard or blighted open area
(MGLB, 1982). Today the Land Bank acts as a finance agency for
municipal economic development and revitalization projects
(Hogan, 1985). Funded by $40 million in Massachusetts General
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Obligation Bonds, the MGLB uses this money to provide loans to
purchasers of properties developed by the Land Bank. However, as
the MGLB does not have eminent domain powers, it is limited in
its abilty to acquire land and hold it out of a speculative
market.
When a city contributes land to a land bank, the city can
use the land bank as an alternative to disposing of property to
private owners. Many of the MGLB's properties come from the
municipalities' tax foreclosed surplus property (MGLB, 1985). In
1982, the Land Bank initiated a Tax Delinquent Housing Program to
"restore vacant or sub-standard residential proerty in tax
arrears to productive use and tax-paying status" (MGLB, 1982:10).
Boston has participated in the program, contributing to the
redevelopment of five tax-foreclosed properties by abating 87
percent of each property's outstanding taxes. Two of the five
projects created low income housing units with two of Boston's
CDCs, Nuestra Comunidad Development Corporation and Living in
Dorchester, Inc., who purchased the properties (MBLB, 1985). As
long as these properties remain held by these community
organizations, the property will serve the housing needs of the
community.
As an alternative to returning vacant tax delinquent
buildings to private for-profit owners, Boston should lobby the
legislature to pass a Suffolk County land bank enabling act and
exploit the financial resources of the Government Land Bank as a
method of assisting CDC's to purchase and renovate foreclosed
buildings.
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C. Regulating Hgw Prggety is Used
in Gentrifying Le~ighbnoods
As part of a new policy to reduce the rate at which
abandoned neighborhoods gentrify, the City should also adopt
regulations that protect low income housing opportunities and
control speculation in residential real estate.
The Supreme Court has continually redefined what constitutes
public purposes in land use regulations. Property may be
regulated by both the police power and the power of taxation
(Bernard, 1979:23). Recent Court decisions illustrate that
regulating property to protect low income housing opportunities
and control speculation is legal when the regulation serves
a public purpose while allowing an owner a reasonable return on her
investment (Coomes, 1986; Cunningham, 1978:331).
Today, the Court maintains a broad definiton of public
benefit (Coomes, 1985). In Berman, the Court not only supported
the use of eminent domain powers to take property for
redevelopment, but set a precedent for a broad definition of the
public good. Justice Douglas stated in his opinion that "the
concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive" (348 U.S. 26).
A spectrum of land use regulations currently limits how
individuals use property. Four types of regulations can mitigate
the effects of gentrification pressures on abandoned
neighborhoods: condominium conversion and rent control
regulations, anti-speculation taxes, building code enforcement,
and Special Purpose Zoning regulations.
Condomi~nium Conversion and Rent Control RegUjations:
Nash is not being called upon to operate a business or
engage in a profession unrelated to the property; his
land lordly obligations are those which arose out of
the ownership of the property which he acquired.
-Justice Grodin
Condo conversion restrictions and rent control regulations
are the most widespread type of mechanism cities use to restrict
private property rights to protect low income housing
opportunities. Limiting the ability of owners to economically
and physically displace low income tenants, these regulations
have been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court and various State
Supreme Courts as legitimate methods of what the Courts believe
to be a legitimate public purpose.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of rent control in a case involving the City of
Berkeley (Globe, 2/27/86). This ruling directs all lower courts
to uphold the constitutionality of rent control in the future.
State Supreme Courts in California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey
have previously upheld this type of ordinance as an appropriate
exercise of the police power to protect the general welfare.
Cambridge's rent control ordinance, established to protect
"decent rental accomodations, especially for low and moderate
income families", has also withstood challenges in the State's
Supreme Court (Flynn vs. City gf Cambridge (1981), 383 Mass.
152).
Nash v. Santa Monica (1984) is one of the clearest examples
of the right of a city to regulate property rights to protect a
stock of rental housing threatened by condominium developers. In
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this case, Nash challenged the City's rent control regulations
which prevented him from demolishing his apartment building, and
in this way removing rental units from the market. The
California Supreme Court upheld the City of Santa Monica's
regulation, maintaining that affordable rental housing served a
legitimate public purpose. In addition, since the regulations
did not prevent Nash from making a reasonable profit, they did
not constitute a taking of property. In this case, Nash's
private property rights were restricted to serve the low income
housing needs of Santa Monica (37 Cal. 3d 97).
In cases challenging condominium conversion restrictions,
the courts have maintained that "an owner's right to utilize his
property must yield to a tenant's interest in keeping his home"
(Puttrich vs. Smith (1979) 170 N.J. Super 572). In Grace vs.
Town of Brookline (1979), the Massachusetts Supreme Court
prevented owners from evicting tenants in order to convert rental
buildings to condominums, even though tenants "limited the
property owner's ability to remove rental units from the rental
market" (379 Mass. 43).
In a new policy on the reuse of vacant buildings, Boston
could incorporate in its rent control regulations an ordinance
requiring full occupancy of its rent controlled units and
buildings, unless good cause for vacancy can be proved. As
mentioned above, Cambridge has set a precedent for this type of
regulation, amending its rent control regulations to make
sustained vacancy a violation. The Full-Occupancy Ordinance
prevents apartment owners from keeping units vacant, stating that
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habitable rental units and buildings which are left vacant for
over 120 days without "good cause" may be taken by the City
through eminent domain powers. A unit vacant for more than three
months that is not under rehabilitation or repair constitutes
removal from the market, an action in conflict to the city's high
need for rental housing (Full Occupancy Ordinance, Ammended Ch.
23, Sec. I of Ordinance 966). (10)
Cambridge has set a precedent for enforcing full occupancy
in the city's rental housing stock. Imposing steep fines and a
threat to take property from owners who keep their rental units
vacant, the city now has a mechanism to force owners of rental
property to meet the city's need for housing. Boston must
consider this type of property regulation as a component of its
rent control laws to elim:inate the ability of owners to keep
rental units vacant.
Boston's condominium conversion permit system is one way the
City regulates the rate at which the city's rental stock is
reduced by conversions of rental units into condominiums. The
Permit System restricts condominium conversions to units that
will be owner-occupied and to buildings where a majority of
tenants agree to buy the converted units and/or form limited
equity co-operatives (Condo Permit System, 1985). In this way
10.. The ordinance seems to be more of a threat to get landlords
to comply with the rent control regulations, than an approach to
acquiring vacant units. To this date, no units have been taken
although two of the 22 cases involving the ordinance have gone
before the rent contol board have been decided in favor of the
City. According to attorneys at the Rent Control Board, the City
is reluctant to evoke eminent domain powers according to the
ordinance because the City lacks the financial resources to
manage and hold property.
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the permit system restricts investors from selecting rental
housing as an avenue through which to profit from Boston's rising
housing market (Tab 12/17/86). In 1965, seventy percent of all
rental units converted into condominiums were completed by
absentee investors (Tab, 12/17/86). Although the City is
currently struggling with the way the Rent Control Board has
interpreted the ordinance, the enactment of the permit system has
cooled the willingness of Boston lenders to finance conversions
(Boston Business Journal, 2/17/86; Tab, 3/4/86).
While rent control regulations and condominium conversion
limitations reduce the ability of investors to receive the full
potential return on rental property, these type of regulations
alone will not significantly reduce the rate at which speculation
in vacant and tax: delinquent buildings occurs in transitional
neighborhoods. Rent control regulations will not
reduce the profitability of holding these vacant buildings for a
speculator investor who purchases such buildings to resell them
at inflated prices. Currently, vacant buildings present a
potential loophole in the new condominium permit system since
vacant buildings and units may be granted a removal permit
because they are vacant. However, these regulatory mechanisms
remain one component of an overall strategy to prevent the loss of
affordable housing resulting from the gentrification process.
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Anti-SReculation Taxes:
Those who enter business take...(the risk) that the
business could fold due to high taxes.
- A. Magano CO. vs. Hamilton
(1934) 292 U.S. 40
Governments adopt anti-speculation taxes in an attempt to
dissuade investors from entering a community's real estate market
and fueling real estate price increases (Cunningham, 1978; Baker,
1975 & 1981; Hagman, 1975). While such taxes can only deter
speculation in real estate, as a complement to other regulations,
these taxes may in fact significantly reduce the level of
speculative activity occurring in a community (Woolry, 1978:12;
Hartman, 1981:34; Teachout, 1971:1172; Baker, 1981).(11)
Anti -specul ation taxes are a source of revenue and a land
use regulation. Anti-speculation taxes create a disincentive to
speculation in property by taxing proceeds from transfers of
interests in property or total value of the transfer at
relatively high rates if the property is held for a short period
of time. Most anti-speculation taxes incorporate a graduated tax
rate that decreases as the holding period increases and/or
decreases as the rate of profit made in the transaction
decreases. The tax is paid by the seller, in addition to Federal
taxes on income and/or capital gains. An anti-speculation tax
intervenes in a real estate market by reducing speculative demand
and supply for property in such a way as to reduce real estate
11. The effect of speculation taxes on the activites of
speculators and the real estate market, as well as the tax
incidence, is difficult to measure because the real estate market
is interlinked with numerous other activites of the private
market and public sector (Baker, 1981).
prices (Baker, 1981).
Like land trusts, speculation taxes are based on Henry
George's philosophy that society should maintain the value in
property created by the investment decisions of the society at
large (Lindholm, 1977:12; Hagman, 1975:437; Davis, 1964). Such
taxes return to the public a portion of a property's socially
created value.
Legal Issues for Boston to Consider in Designing an Anti-
Speculation Tax:
If a state can levy a tax based on legitimate public
policy determination, the taxation of business profits
at high rates is not a taking without just compensation
in violation of the 14th Ammendment.
-Teachout, 1971
In the only legal challenge to a U.S. anti-speculation tax,
the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the Vermont Land Gains Tax as
both a legitimate regulation of the land market for a public
purpose and as a legal form of taxation. In Andrew vs. Lathro2
(1974), the Court stated that regulating speculation in land was
a compelling public need (132 Vt. 256). Vermont supplied factual
evidence that increased speculation was associated with increased
land prices. In addition, the Court held that the tax complies
with both Federal and state constitutional requirements for
designing a tax. The high rate (60 percent) imposed on
profitable short-term holding was not declared unconstitiutional
as an unfair burden or uncompensated taking of property, or as an
artibtrary exercise of legislative power (Baker, 1981). A tax
cannot violate due process requirements just because it renders a
business unprofitable (Cunningham, 1978:336, cites City gf
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Pittsburgh vs. Alco Parking Authority (1978) 417 U.S. 369).
Exemptions from the tax, such as primary home sites, were also
declared to be non-discriminatory since they were reasonably
related to the goal of reducing speculation by investors who are
not owner-occupants (Baker, 1981).
In order for Massachusetts or any of its cities to adopt an
anti-speculation tax, the tax must comply with the state's
uniform taxation clause. Article 44 states that all income taxes
must be levied at uniform rates (Bernard, 1979). Although taxes
in Massachusetts may be classified in various categories having
different tax rates themselves, rates within each classification
must be the same.
Therefore, anti-speculation taxes must be legislated not as
a type of capital gains tax on income, but as an excise tax,
which may be levied at variable rates in Massachusetts (Baker,
1981:67; Bernard, 1979:51). Excise taxes are imposed on the
exercise of a right of property ownership, including the right to
own and transfer property. Even if an excise tax is imposed on a
value of property, it legally taxes a right of property ownership
(Cunningham, 1978:325). Davis, California has adopted a transfer
tax on sales of residential housing graduated based on length of
ownership using the concept of an excise tax; under an enabling
act called the Document Transfer-Tax Act, cities in California
may impose taxes on documents transferring real property, not the
real property itself (Cunningham, 1978:318).
However, the uniformity requirement for taxes in
Massachusetts in not insurmountable; Massachusetts has allowed
agricultural land to be assessed at its use value for purposes of
property taxation under Article 99 of the state constitution and
open space is preferentially taxed under Article 110.
Massachusetts has recognized how the power to tax is the power to
regulate how land is used (Lindholm, 1977:23).
Taxes Targeting Speculation in Residential Real Estate:
The way in which an anti-speculation tax is designed depends
upon its intended goal. Tax rates, holding period requirements,
and exemptions may all be manipulated to create disincentives to
speculation activity. To reduce the amount of speculation in
land, Vermont levies a Land Gains Tax on the land portion of the
gain from sales only when they are highly profitable and occur
after short holding periods (Baker, 1975 & 1981; Hagman, 1975;
Rose, 1973). The Province of Ontario, Canada designed its Land
Speculation Tax to dissuade foreign investment in land. While
Ontario imposes a twenty percent tax rate on the sale price of
land for sales involving non-resident investors, residents pay a
0.3 percent tax on the first $35,000 in value and 0.6 percent on
the balance of the land value (Hagman, 1975:440). Santa Cruz,
California designed an anti-speculation tax to target speculative
sales of property by taxing only gain from extraordinary
inflation. This tax exempted any property sold for no more than
a three percent annual increase over the owner's purchase price
(Cunningham, 1978:35). Seeking preservation of agricultural
land, Montana House Bill 651 introduced an anti-speculation tax
exempting all land which had restrictive agricultural use
covenants running with the land (Baker, 1975).
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While both the Vermont and Ontario taxes attempt to regulate
the rate at which land prices rise, Washington D.C.'s speculation
tax targets speculation in residential property. The only anti-
speculation tax legislated by a city, D.C.'s tax imposed a 97
percent tax rate on gains of over 300 percent for property sold
after less than a six month holding period (Richards, 1977).
Using a graduated tax based on the holding time and the
profitability of the transaction, the D.C. tax hit short-term
purchasers with extremely high rates. Only San Francisco's
proposed tax came near D.C.'s, with a tax rate of GC) percent for
transactions occuring within a year from the purchase (Hartman,
1981).
Designing an anti-speculation tax exempting certain
improvements to property as well as transactions involving owner-
occupied dwellings can also target the speculator who invests
little or no capital in improving the property. Exempting
capital improvements and rehabilitation work may dissuade
speculators from keeping their property vacant and uninhabitable
(Richards, 1977). Both the San Francisco tax and the D.C. tax
use exemptions to encourage capital improvement in property held
for short periods of time by reducing the gain from sale by the
cost of capital improvements to the property (Hartman, 1981:35).
D.C. exempted transactions of property having two year warranties
attached to all major rehabilitation work to encourage quality
renovation of property (Hartman, 1981:33; Richards, 1977).
Boston can learn from both the Vermont and Washington D.C.
experiences in designing a tax which will actually be
implemented. For example, since D.C. did not create a department
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to administer and enfore the tax, only 30 percent of transactions
covered by the law filed taxes (D.C. Department of Finance and
Revenue, 1980). In addition, numerous exemptions allowed all but
four people of these thirty percent to claim they were exempt
from the tax (Hartman, 1981). The D.C. tax was so poorly
administered, including reliance on six agencies to implement the
tax, that it was repealed in 1981 by the City Council (Hartman,
1981). Vermont collects the tax at the time of transfer, as did
D.C. after the City realized that collecting the tax along with
other state income taxes led to an inability to monitor and
enforce compliance with the tax.
Most authors of articles about anti-speculation taxes
advocate designing taxes which can be easily administered.
Vermont' Land Gains Tax taxes only gain on transactions
attributable to the land portion of a property. Property sellers
must therefore calculate the Land Gains Tax for each transaction
by allocating portions of the gain from sale and allowable
deductions to the building and to the land. This tax requires
expensive monitoring by the State to make sure that it is
calculated correctly (Baker, 1975). Boston could eliminate
calculating the gain from sale by taxing property value at time
of the transfer, like Taiwan's Land Increment Tax, to simplify
enforcing and administering a tax (Harris, 1977:57; Hagman,
1975).
An anti-speculation tax which is properly administered and
enforced could dissuade investors from speculating in tax
delinquent vacant buildings in transitional neighborhoods as well
as in all properties in Boston's transitional areas.
Building Code Enforcement:
Building codes regulate how property owners use and maintain
their property in order to protect the health and safety of
occupants and the general public. Boston should consider using
the existing enforcement provisions in the State Building
and State Sanitation Codes not only to condemn vacant buildings,
but also to impose fines on their owners. Boston should also
consider mechanisms other cities have used to dissuade owners of
vacant buildings to keep their buildings vacant. Codes should be
enforced on a case by case basis to protect displacement of low
income tenants and owners who cannot afford the cost of extensive
repairs and renovations to property (Hartman, 1974).
Under the current State Building and Sanitation Codes,
Boston may fine code violators and condemn property posing
extreme health and safety hazards to the public. However, since
all fines must be set by a judge, imposing fines in court usually
costs the City more than the value of the fine (Young, 1986). In
addition, the City is reluctant to condemn hazardous buildings
for the same reasons it is reluctant to foreclose on such
property: the City assumes a high liability risk and is unable to
quickly sell and/or redevelop the property. Also, since most
buildings designated for condemnation by the building inspector
should be demolished, the City is currently not condemning
property because the City has not approriated adequate funds for
demolition recent years as Federal CDBG money has dried up
(Young, 1986; McDermott, 1986).
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An alternative to imposing court-ordered fines is to set
fines by an administrative board. However, imposing fines for
criminal action in civil proceedings lacking traditional criminal
safeguards may not be constitutional (Carlton, 1965:148;
Wienerman, 1986). However, under Chapter 40, Secion 21D of the
Massachusetts General Laws, ISD recently instituted fines,
similar to those levied in a parking ticket, to commercial
property owners who do not remove their rubbish according to code
(Wienerman, 1986).
Fines and threats to condemn property may be used, however,
as an enforcement lever if they can prevent property owners from
profitably owning a rental building (Marion, 1983). To dissuade
owners from keeping housing units vacant, Boston should consider
imposing steep fines on property owners who keep their property
vacant for over a designated number of days. The City should
also consider threatening to take vacant property that violates
the Building and Sanitation Codes.
Building codes stating that vacant buildings cannot persist
in urban areas is not without precedent. New York City has
legislated that multi-family buildings observed vacant for more
than sixty days without a current certificate of occupancy, are
in violation of the building code. The City threatens to fine
owners of such properties and take the property if the vacant
condition is not remedied (Boston Finance Commission, 1970:30).
Unfortunately, this law is only enforced if the vacant property
is also tax delinquent (Post, 1986; Taylor, 1966). Baltimore has
passed an ordinance similar to New York City's; Ordinance 774
(1.961) required owners of vacant buildings to begin repairs or
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demolition within ninety days of a notice of observed vacancy
(Carlton, 1965:834).
However, imposing fines for a vacant condition alone may not
be legal if the building is safely boarded (Coomes, 1986;
Wienerman, 1986). An alternative to imposing fines for purely
vacant conditions would be to require all owners of rental
buildings greater than five units to have a license to operate,
renewable every year conditional upon an inspection that the
property is actually being used for the purpose for which is
zoned--housing. Washington, D.C. and Baltimore have both
instituted this type of license, which is granted each year upon
a City inspection. In D.C., owners who are found to be
unlicensed operators can be fined and jailed for up to ninety
days (Carlton, 1965:834). Licenses such as these have been
upheld by State Courts based on the concept that the power to
regulate an activity implies the power to license the activity
(Carlton, 1965:834 cites McBriety vs. Mayor and City gogunil,
(1959) 29 Md. 223).
An alternative to imposing fines or criminal sanctions
against code violators is to prevent owners of property violating
codes from deducting from state income taxes the costs of owning
investment property. California has used this method to
circumvent the judicial system of enforcing building code
violations. California disallows state income tax deductions of.
interest, real estate taxes, depreciation, or amortization paid
or incurred during the tax year for owners of rental residential
property on cities' substandard housing lists (Marion, 1983).
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Substandard housing "violates state law or local codes dealing
with health, safety, or buildings and...has not been brought to a
condition of compliance within six months..." (Section 17274 of
the CA Revenue and Taxation Code). A bill currently befor the
State Assembly would reduce from six months to sixty days the
time in which a substandard building's conditions have to be
remedied under Section 17274 (California AB 4005).
California has also created an innovative program to assist
low income owner-occupants to bring their property to code
standards. The State pays back to each city's building
inspection department the value of the deductions disallowed to
resident-owners within their jurisdiction (Marion, 1983: 404).
Under the legislation, a city can set up a loan fund to assist
low and moderate income owners correct property conditions that
endanger lives (Marion, 1983b:4C)0). By co-ordinating with the
California Department of Revenue, San Francisco received $191,151
in both FY 1979 and 1980 for its Code Enforcement and
Rehabilitation Fund (CERF) (Marion, 1983b:400).
To implement these types of regulations, Boston will have to
increase the funding level for the ISD's Abandoned Building Unit.
Although the Mayor recently allocated additional funds to the ISD
f or the Pilot Program in Dorchester, this program will only be
continued if it receives funding in the future. In addition,
the ABU needs fifty building inspectors alone to simply cite the
code violations of all Boston's buildings (Young, 1986).
Tailoring building codes to reduce speculation in vacant
and ta: delinquent buildings is probably the least effective type
of regulation discussed thus far. However, the existing State
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Codes provide enforcement techniques to induce negligent land
lords to maintain their property for the public good;
discretionary code enforcement that penalized owners of both tax
delinquent and non-tax delinquent vacant buildings may in fact
dissuade speculators from investing in such properties.
Speial Purosge Districts:
Special Purpose District zoning regulations enable a city to
control all aspects of development in a neighborhood. Boston
could implement this type of planning tool in its transforming
neighborhoods to dramatically affect how these neighborhoods
renew. Since Euclid vs. Ambler Realty (1929), zoning has been
upheld as a legitimate exercise of government's police power to
contol urban development. (271 U.S. 365) No development in a
Special Purpose District can proceed without approval from a
zoning board.
The Boston Experience: the IPOD
Boston has just instituted a Special Purpose District under
the newly revised zoning code called an IPOD: Interim Planning
Overlay District. In revising the zoning code, the BRA developed
the IPOD to enable the City to prevent unplanned development in
designated areas of Boston. When an area is declared an IPOD,
the BRA and a community advisory board establish a new zoning
code for the area. Lasting for two years, IPOD status means that
the BRA will require special permits for any changes in property
use or status, and the community will have an institutionalized
method of participating in both its current and future
development. Theoretically, an IPOD can be used to prevent
condominium conversions, speculation in real estate, and
displacement of low income tenants in transitional neighborhoods.
However, the City has only imposed one IPOD in a residential
neighborhood. For example, Boylston Street is an IPOD in order
to protect the low rise character of this commercial strip.
Similarly, an IPOD will soon be implemented along the length of
Huntington Avenue, home to approximately fifty cultural and
educational institutions. Unfortunately, the BRA has not
designated as IPODs those areas in Boston, like the Dudley
Station area, that have been targeted for public investment and
as a consequence, attract real estate speculators. The City has
not chosen to use the IPOD as a way to restrict displacement of
low income residents as the value of real estate increases in
transitional neighborhoods. Only East Boston, which has no
history of disinvestment and displacement, has been designated as
an IPOD by the BRA.
The BRA gave East Boston IPOD status to preserve the areas's
affordability. In the last few years the renewal of East
Boston has dramatically increased the area's real estate values
by 200 to 300 percent. Although rate of increase in the number
of rental units converted to condominiums from 1980 to 1985 has
been over 1000 percent, only 14 buildings have been converted.
This "trend" of increasing conversions led to the IPOD
designation (Globe, 2/22/66a). In addition to controlling the
number of rental units converted into condominiums in the next
two years, IPOD status will allow the City and the community to
decide the fate of East Boston's twenty-three vacant residential
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buildings, including the twenty-one that are not tax delinquent.
If the Dudley Square area were an IPOD, the City could
decrease the level of displacement likely to occur following the
massive investment in the area's real estate. Currently,
speculators hold many of the vacant residential and commercial
buildings, waiting to realize appreciation in property value when
the City tears down the old elevated subway tracks in the next
year or so (Realtor, Foster & Foster). If this area had been
designated an IPOD prior to the the BRA's announcement of its
revitalization plans for the area, perhaps the City could have
controlled who will benefit from reinvestment in the neighborhood
(Gaston & Kennedy, 1985).
Boston now has a zoning tool that possibly can prevent large
scale displacement of low income residents in transitional
neighborhoods by controlling how development affects the cost of
property in such areas. Marcuse recommends that all of New York
City's transitional areas be placed in zoning districts to ensure
renewal occurs with out displacement (Marcuse, 1985). Boston
must also use the IPOD to help mitigate the effects of the
gentrification process in poor neighborhoods.
D. Summary
The City has a choice. It can support gentrification of
poor neighborhoods to increase the municipal tax base or
increase the number of housing opportunities for low income
people. While these two goals are not the only possibilities for
a City policy on vacant buildings, the Flynn administration has
e7
directed considerable effort to meeting these goals and
proclaiming to the citizens of Boston that the Mayor considers
achieving each goal a "priority" of his administration. The
existing policy approach attempts to meet the goal of expanding
the municipal tax base, yet it is counter productive to Flynn's
efforts to increase the supply of affordable housing. In
transferring vacant buildings to the Citywide Land Trust and
controlling how people use residential real estate, the City may
be able to work towards reaching both goals through its policy on
vacant buildings. This new policy approach may not lead to as
high a rate of increase in the City's tax base, but it can at
least secure real estate taxes from properties that were not
previously generating tax revenue. At the same time, the new
policy approach enable the City to both protect the supply of
existing affordable housing and create affordable housing
opportunities out of abandoned buildings.
This new policy approach may be implemented by first
reforming how the City acquires vacant buildings, both tax
delinquent and not tax delinquent, by using tax-title foreclosure
and eminent domain powers. The City should donate these
properties to the Citywide Land Trust, which can remove the land
portion of property out of the specualtive market and thus
prevent increases in these properties' value.
If The City is unable to acquire vacant buildings through
either tax-foreclosure or eminent domain, the City should
consider donating these buildings to the Government Land Bank or
a Suffolk County land bank (if and when one is allowed by the
state legislature) that can perform functions similar to the
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Citywide Land Trust.
City efforts to create affordable housing out of vacant
buildings should not stop at acquiring them and donating them to
the Land Trust or a land bank. The City must control how vacant
buildings are used to mitigate the effects of speculation in
residential real estate that results in increased housing prices.
If the City has the political will to do this, the legal
mechanisms--condominium conversion and rent control regulations,
anti-speculation taxes, building code enforcement tools, and
Special District Zoning--exist to help the City realize the goal
of increasing the housing opportunities availabe to low income
people. Perhaps the City can then resolve the dilemma of
unhoused residents living in neighborhoods littered with vacant
buildings.
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V. EPILOGUE
I began this thesis wondering why vacant buildings persist
in renewing neighborhoods. In the process of studying both the
literature on neighborhood change--decline, renewal, and
gentrification--and Boston's vacant building policy, my original
question evolved into a vehicle for entering an abyss called
urban public policy.
While exploring the role played by vacant buildings in the
process of neighborhood change, I stepped into the shoes of the
City Bureaucrat to consider how the City might rethink its
vacant building policy to not only encompass the goal of
receiving real estate taxes from abandoned buildings, but the
objective of increasing the supply of affordable housing. What
the City policy could not do, or worked against--increasing the
housing opportunities for low income people--became the point of
departure for both my analysis of the policy's limitations and my
suggested policy approach. The weakness to the current policy
has hopefully become the strength of the new policy approach,
which not only secures real estate taxes for the City, but
creates housing for the city's low income residents.
Yet, when I entered the realm of City Hall to formulate an
alternative policy approach to vacant buildings, I unwittingly
created a contradiction. While I criticize the City's ability to
implement the vacant building policy, nevertheless, all my policy
recommendations, both to the policy's implementation and for a
new policy approach, are dependent on the City--its mandate,
structure, and resources. Although I propose an alternative
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system for an information network on vacant buildings, I do not
propose a fundamental reorganization of the way in which Boston
municipal government operates. In addition, while I recommend
that the Citywide Land Trust should be given a primary role in
the new policy approach, I suggest that the City form a
"partnership" with the Land Trust. Again, the policy approach I
suggest is either imbedded in or dependent on the City.
Not only do I contradict my analysis of the policy when I
propose an alternative policy that is implemented by Boston's
city government, but I imply that the City will embrace a policy
approach to increase the supply of low income housing by
reducing the extent to which Boston's poor neighborhoods
gentrify. This assumption is naive; gentrification is to most
municipal policy makers a desired outcome of both urban public
policy and private market forces. Although gentrification
involves an increase in real estate values that displaces lower
income residents from poor inner city neighborhoods, it also
increases the City's tax base, increases the amount of disposable
income spent in the city's businesses, and reduces the level of
municipal expenditures on social services for the poor. Thus,
gentrification is "good" for Boston and City Hall. By increasing
real estate values, gentrification is beneficial to those who own
urban land, especially residential property.
I propose a policy approach that is "good" for the city's
poor residents, not just for the few who own real estate. An
unspoken premise of this thesis is that redistributing land from
for-profit owners to the community at large is a starting point
for an equitable policy on returning vacant buildings to
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residential use. A public policy on vacant buildings must
explictly consider who owns the vacant buildings because
who benefits from vacant buildings depends to a large extent on
who is allowed to own them. Urban public policy must directly
face the issue of land ownership because most, if not all, urban
policy affects who has the right to own and therefore use land
resources.
Boston's vacant building policy and the new policy approach
I have suggested share two themes. Each policy approach states
who should own vacant buildings and how these buildings should be
used. Moreover, each policy is a reaction to recent issues
emerging from Boston's path of development. On one hand,
Boston's vacant building policy must have as a goal increasing
the amount of collectable real estate tax revenues, for the City
is faced with a finite amount of taxable land, a decreasing share
of Federal funds, and infinite possibilties for expanding City
expenses. Boston must also resolve the dilemma of a shrinking
supply of housing available to low income people who live in
neighborhoods with marred by unused housing resources. The
policy approach I have suggested is one way to resolve this
development paradox while returning vacant buildings to
residential use and tax-paying status.
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APPENDIX A:
SUMMARY OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEPARTMENTS INVOLVED WITH
THE TAX-TITLE FORECLOSURE PROCESS, CITY OF BOSTON
Six City departments are involved in the tax-title
foreclosure process: the Collector-Treasurer's Office , Tax-Title
Office, State Land Court, Assessing Department, Real Property
Department, and Public Facilities Department. Four stages
compose the foreclosure process: tax-title taking, petition to
foreclose, final decree, and owner redemption period.
COLLECTOR-TREA~SURER:
The Collector-Treasurer collects real estate taxes from
property owners. Upon non-payment of real estate taxes for one
year, the Collector-Treasurer records a tax-title taking, or tax
lien, with the Registry of Deeds where all titles are filed for
Suffolk County. If a property remains tax delinquent for more
than six months after the tax-title taking has been recorded, the
Collector-Treasurer requests foreclosure petition processing from
the Tax-Title Office. This six month delay is the only statutory
time limit imposed on the tax-title foreclosure process.
TAX-TITLE OFFICE:
As one section of the City's Law Department, the Tax-Title
Office files foreclosure petitions in the State Land Court. The
Tax-Title Office has historically exercised much discretion in
selecting which foreclosure petitions to forward to the Land
Court (APC, 1965). The Tax-Title Office requests trial dates for
contested actions and requests the Land Court to foreclose on
property if the petition to foreclose is not contested.
STTIE LAND COURT:
Understaffed with only one sitting judge and five
staff examiners, the Land Court is responsible for deciding all
foreclosure cases in Massachusetts. The Land Court hires title
examiners or uses staff title examiners to do title searches
going back into a property's records for twenty years in order to
identify all parties who have an interest in a property subject
to a foreclosure petition. The Court also notifies all
interested parties according to State law, and publishes the
information in the Boston Globe if the whereabouts of the any
interested parties is unkown by the Court.
The Land Court grants a decree of foreclosure to the City if
the ruling judge decides against the delinquent property owner.
The Court also ruies on contested petitions to foreclose and
final foreclosure decrees. Final foreclosure decrees may be
contested within one year. after the foreclosure decree is filed,
and within 90 days for abandoned buildings. These periods are
referred to as the owner's redemption period. In the case of an
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appeal ruled in favor of the previous owner, the Land Court
directs the owner to the Assessing Department.
ASSESSING DEPARTMENT:
The Assessing Department has discretion to abate back taxes
for hardship cases, including elderly, low income, and over-
assessed owners. The Assessing Department also negotiates
extended payment plans for hardship cases which cannot pay
current taxes biyearly as the City requires.
REAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT (RPD)
The RPD manages City property acquired through the tax-title
foreclosure process, until the property is held by the Public
Facilities Department or the Boston Redevelopment Authority for
reuse.
PUBLIC FACILTIES DEPARTMENT (PFD):
The PFD receives foreclosed property from the RDP and
disposes of City surplus property, including foreclosed
properties and obsolete City schools, hospitals, and other public
facilities. The PFD has eminent domain powers to acquire property
for public purposes.
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SUMMARY OF TAX-TITLE FORECLOSURE PROCESS
ACTION: WHO TAKES ACTION:
1. Taxes due (1st half) Collector-Treasurer
2. Demand for Payment
3. Notice of Warrant "o
4. Taxes due (2nd half)
(Owner does not pay taxes and is now considered
WHEN: *
November
November
December
May 1
deli nquent)
5. Tax-Title Taking
(tax lein)
6. Petiton to Foreclose
Collector-Treasurer
sends to Registry of Deeds
Tax-Title Office sends
to State Land Court
June 30
December
TIME ELASPED PRIOR TO ACTION TAKEN BY LAND COURT: 13 months
. Foreclosure Case
(title search, notice,
appeal s)
P. Final Decree Granted
Boston
9. Boston Acquires
Clear Title
State Land Court
State Land Court
State Land Court
TOTAL TIME ELASPED IN TAX-TITLE FORECLOSURE PROCESS:
Up to 13
months **
I
1 year after
Final Decree
(Owner 's
Redempt i on
Period)
2 1/2 years
to
3 1/2 years
Sources: APC, 1985; PDC, 1985; and Collector-Treasurer, 1985.
* In a non-discretionary process in an efficiently operating
system.
** Once the case reaches the Land Court and is contested, the
actual ruling on the case can take from six months to eighteen
months.
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15
1
30)
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